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Abstract
This thesis describes a set of novel algorithms and models designed to detect illicit behaviour.
This includes development of domain specific solutions, focusing on anti-money laundering
and detection of opinion spam. In addition, advancements are presented for the mining and
application of contrast patterns, which are a useful tool for characterising illicit behaviour.
For anti-money laundering, this thesis presents a novel approach for detection based on
analysis of financial networks and supervised learning. This includes the development of a
network model, features extracted from this model, and evaluation of classifiers trained using
real financial data. Results indicate that this approach successfully identifies suspicious
groups whose collaborative behaviour is indicative of money laundering.
For the detection of opinion spam, this thesis presents a model of reviewer behaviour
and a method for detection based on statistical anomaly detection. This method considers
review ratings, and does not rely on text-based features. Evaluation using real data shows
that spammers are successfully identified. Comparison with existing methods shows a small
improvement in accuracy, but significant improvements in computational e ciency.
This thesis also considers the application of contrast patterns to network analysis and
presents a novel algorithm for mining contrast patterns in a distributed system. Contrast
patterns may be used to characterise illicit behaviour by contrasting illicit and non-illicit
behaviour and uncovering significant di↵erences. However, existing mining algorithms are
limited by serial processing making them unsuitable for large data sets. This thesis advances
the current state-of-the-art, describing an algorithm for mining in parallel. This algorithm is
evaluated using real data and is shown to achieve a high level of scalability, allowing mining
of large, high-dimensional data sets. In addition, this thesis explores methods for mapping
network features to an item-space suitable for analysis using contrast patterns. Experiments
indicate that contrast patterns may become a valuable tool for network analysis.
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1. Introduction
This thesis describes a set of novel data mining algorithms and domain models intended for
use in detecting illicit behaviour. Detection of illicit behaviour is a challenging area of research
due to the adversarial nature of the relevant problem domains. Entities that exhibit illicit
behaviour often attempt to mask their intent, hiding their illicit activities amongst legitimate
activity. In many situations, these entities have multiple options for achieving their goals,
with each option leading to quite di↵erent types of observable behaviour. Moreover, entities
may modify their activities over time, possibly in response to detection systems that target
particular behaviours.
Two problem domains are explored in this thesis as motivation for detection of illicit
activities; money laundering and opinion spam. Illicit activities associated with these problem
domains impose significant financial costs and, particularly in the case of money laundering,
significantly impact the wellbeing of society (further described in Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2,
respectively). Both of these problem domains continue to be active areas of research, with
data mining seen as a valuable tool for detection of the relevant behaviour. While these two
domains form the major focus of this thesis, the work conducted has lead to more general
advancements in data mining capabilities, and these advancements are also presented in this
thesis.
In some situations, detection of illicit behaviour may be trivially reduced to detection of
individual illicit actions. In these situations, actions may be linked to the entity performing
the action, and detection of an illicit action implies that the linked entity exhibits illicit
behaviour. For example, individual spam reviews may be identified by considering the text
of the review and comparing this to other known spam reviews (e.g. [141]). Obviously,
by identifying a spam review, the spam reviewer is also identified and action may be taken
against that reviewer. However, illicit behaviour may involve multiple actions that are only
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identified as illicit when the full set of actions is considered as a whole. For example, a
single cash transaction slightly below the minimum reporting threshold may not be deemed
illicit. However, several such transactions by the same entity on the same day provides strong
evidence of illicit behaviour (this is referred to as structuring). In this thesis, focus is given
to detection of illicit behaviour, rather than illicit actions.
1.1 General overview of example problem domains
In developing solutions for detecting illicit behaviour this thesis considers anti-money laun-
dering and detection of opinion spam as example problem domains. Both money laundering
and opinion spam impose significant economic and societal burdens, and detection of illicit
behaviour within these domains continues to be an active area of research. A broad overview
of the two domains is given in the following sections, while chapter 2 provides an extensive
review of previous research directly relevant to this thesis.
1.1.1 Money laundering
Money laundering is the process by which criminal groups attempt to obfuscate the original
source of funds derived from illegal activity. Money laundering is a global problem, and has
numerous detrimental e↵ects on society. In particular, laundering of funds allows criminal
groups to realise a profit from their crimes, providing free capital that may then be used to
finance further criminal activity. In addition, money laundering can significantly undermine
confidence in financial systems and financial institutions, and damage local economies.
The term money laundering stems from the use of laundrettes as a front business for
organised criminal groups operating in the USA during the prohibition era [179]. However,
the act of obfuscating the source of funds, or the true owners of these funds, has a far longer
history [162].
In Australia, money laundering is defined as a criminal act with penalties set out in Section
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400 of the Criminal Code. Provisions in the criminal code relate to both the proceeds and
instruments of crime, with severity of the crime dictated by the amounts involved and the
extent to which implicated parties were aware of the source or purpose of the illicit funds.
In recent years data mining and machine learning techniques have been shown to be
highly suited for detection of money laundering, owing to the large volumes of data and the
complex nature of transaction relationships (e.g. [90, 42, 100, 89, 188]). This thesis advances
the current state-of-the-art by modelling financial data as a transaction network and treating
small communities extracted from this network as observations for data mining and machine
learning. Since money laundering is inherently a group activity, evidence of money laun-
dering will often include multiple transactions and multiple interacting parties (individuals,
businesses, etc.). By analysing small communities it is anticipated that suspicious activity
may be uncovered that is not apparent when parties are analysed in isolation. This thesis
contributes models and novel algorithms for performing this type of analysis.
While money laundering is a global problem, this thesis will at times consider money
laundering from an Australian perspective. This reflects the fact that the research described
was conducted in collaboration with Australia’s financial intelligence unit, the Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).
1.1.1.1 Scale and impact
Given the clandestine nature of money laundering, it is di cult to estimate the extent of
the problem. In 2003, the World Bank estimated that at least US$1 trillion was laundered
each year. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has estimated that at least
US$600 billion was laundered in 2003 (see [180, 21]). However, methods used to obtain these
estimates have been criticised [154], and it has been suggested that there is an over-emphasis
on estimating the amount of money laundered while more important measures are ignored
[105, 154]. One argument is that the various estimates are meaningless since they cannot
be compared; changes in estimates from one year to the next are likely to reflect di↵erences
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in the estimating process rather than actual changes in amounts laundered [154]. However,
the more conservative estimates put forward by these critics still place the total amount
laundered at several hundreds of billions (US) each year.
While the extent of money laundering is disputed, it is widely accepted that unchecked
money laundering can severely damage economies and impose significant burdens on society
[155, 21].
At a local-scale, since successful laundering of illicit funds results in additional crime,
money laundering can be said to negatively impact on individuals’ health and wellbeing. In
addition, money laundering operations can have significant impacts on legitimate businesses,
who may be forced to compete with front businesses with no need to turn a real profit
[121]. Furthermore, since devices used for money laundering are often minor variations on
devices used by legitimate businesses, money laundering can impact consumer confidence in
businesses that use these products, and financial institutions that provide them 1 [17].
At the macro-scale, high levels of money laundering can distort economic data, making
it di cult for policy makers and investors to make sound decisions [150, 161, 21]. Moreover,
money laundering syndicates may lobby for reduced regulation of certain financial services or
the introduction of new products that are suitable for laundering [17]. When combined with
high levels of corruption, such lobbying is likely to result in highly vulnerable economies.
In addition, increases in crime that follow from successful money laundering may negatively
impact consumption [8] and impose significant costs for health services and law enforcement.
1.1.1.2 The money laundering process
Organised criminal groups have shown themselves to be highly inventive in developing money
laundering typologies2. Any means by which funds can legitimately change hands can be
1For example, following release of the ‘Panama papers’ significant e↵ort was made to explain that the
individuals or corporations making use of o↵shore tax-havens were not necessarily criminals
2Typologies describe the relationships between various parties involved in a money laundering operation,
the flow of funds between them, and the specific channels and mechanisms used to transfer value. See for
example, [11]
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corrupted for use by money launderers, leading to a multitude of options for transferring illicit
funds [60]. However, despite the diversity of typologies, the process of money laundering is
generally considered to follow three main stages; placement, layering and integration [10].
The placement stage of money laundering represents the introduction of funds obtained
through criminal activities into the financial system. Typically, this involves deposits that
are spread over time and geographical locations. Once the funds have been placed into the
financial system, layering is undertaken in order to hide the original source of the funds.
This stage includes numerous transactions, and often involves o↵shore accounts and complex
investment vehicles. In the final stage, integration, funds (or equivalent value) are transferred
to the actual owners, often in the form of investments or tangible goods (e.g. jewellery, high-
end cars, etc.).
Traditionally, criminals are considered to be most vulnerable during the placement stage.
This is because large volumes of cash can be di cult to move and financial institutions are
typically quite sensitive to unusual behaviour relating to cash deposits 3 Moreover, those
parties involved in placement are more likely to be directly involved in predicate crimes, and
are therefore more likely to be identified through discovery of these crimes.
Once illegally obtained funds enter the formal banking system, layering and integration
can be achieved through the vast range of services that are available for movement of legit-
imate funds [10]. Traditionally, anti-money laundering programs have had limited success
in detecting money laundering during these later stages. However, it is hoped that further
research into the application of data mining techniques will improve detection capabilities in
these later stages.
In addition to the three stages of money laundering, AUSTRAC has identified four key
behaviours relating to money laundering activity in Australia [10].
3The financial action task force (FATF) recommends that anti-money laundering programs include manda-
tory reporting by remitters of cash deposits above a certain threshold and the submission of reports relating
to any suspicious behaviour. This includes behaviour observed by sta↵ at the time that the deposit is made.
In Australia, financial institutions must alert AUSTRAC to suspicious behaviour within 3 days (24 hours if
the matter relates to terrorism financing).
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1. Criminal groups intermingle illicit and legitimate activity
2. Criminal groups engage professional expertise (lawyers, accountants, etc.)
3. Criminal groups engage specialist money laundering syndicates
4. Organised crime in Australia has strong links with international organisations
While data mining techniques hold much promise for detection of money laundering,
these four behaviours suggest that reliable detection poses a significant challenge. Clearly,
criminal groups actively seek to hide their money laundering activities, and the mingling of
illicit funds with legitimate funds means that suspicious behaviour will often look extremely
similar to non-criminal behaviour unless viewed in a suitable feature space. Moreover, the
engagement of finance professionals and money laundering specialists means that the layering
and integration stages are likely to involve complex financial instruments and investments
within a global market. This supports the notion expressed above, that evidence of money
laundering will necessarily include multiple transactions and multiple parties, requiring a
network-based approach for detection through data mining.
In this thesis, Chapter 3 describes a system for detecting suspicious behaviour in a finan-
cial network. This system provides an example for detection of illicit behaviour that results
from the coordinated activities of multiple individuals.
1.1.2 Opinion spam
Online product reviews, reporting others experience with a given product, can be extremely
useful for consumers making purchasing decisions. Given the bounty of choice available
in online stores, product reviews provide a helpful aid for consumers attempting to gauge
product quality and decide between di↵erent brands and di↵erent product models. However,
in recent years, opinion spam, consisting of fake reviews published by individuals with vested
interests, has become a major problem for consumers [84, 98, 72]. Opinion spam typically
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involves the publication of fake product reviews for the explicit purpose of influencing a
buyers’ perceptions of quality and utility [84, 98]. By publishing numerous fake reviews,
opinion spammers attempt to artificially inflate consumers’ confidence that previous buyers
are satisfied with their purchase. Alternatively, spammers may attempt to create an artificial
belief that previous buyers of a competitors’ product have come to be dissatisfied with their
purchase.
Previous approaches to detecting opinion spam have tended to focus on analysis of re-
view text (see Heydari et al. [72] for a comprehensive survey of existing methods). These
approaches rely on the identification of duplicated passages of text occurring in multiple
reviews (e.g. Jindal and Liu [84], Lau et al. [101], Mukherjee, Liu, and Glance [131], and
Mukherjee et al. [132]), or consider multiple text-based features, using manually identified
opinion spam to train classifiers (e.g. Ott et al. [141], Li et al. [106], Ramkumar, Rajasekar,
and Swamynathan [151], and Fusilier et al. [53]). While these text-based approaches have
been used with success, they su↵er three major drawbacks [2]. First, detection of repeated
text requires expensive comparisons, and without first narrowing down the selection of can-
didates the number of comparisons required may quickly become infeasible. Second, new
training data is often required for di↵erent product domains (e.g. hardware products vs
restaurant reviews), and third, manual identification of opinion spam for use in training can
be an expensive and time-consuming undertaking. Moreover, many rating systems in use
today require only a rating (typically expressed as a binary good/bad or as 1   5 stars),
with a text-based review optional (e.g. the Apple App Store), or not possible at all (e.g.
the Facebook ‘like’ system). Thus, there is a need to develop methods for detecting opinion
spam based solely on ratings [2].
Many online shopping services display the mean rating for available products, and this
has been shown to be a key piece of information used by consumers in making their purchas-
ing decisions [32]. Thus, one way in which opinion spammers attempt to alter consumers’
perception of quality is to manipulate the mean rating for a target product. By generating
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multiple reviews that appear to have originated from di↵erent users, spammers are able to
significantly distort the mean rating [2, 131]. However, in doing so, spammers are often
required to post ratings that are at odds with those of honest reviewers, and consequently
opinion spammers can be expected to have an abnormal number of reviews that significantly
di↵er from the mean rating.
In this thesis, a novel approach to detection of opinion spam is proposed that focuses on
review ratings (e.g number of stars). This approach detects opinion spammers by identifying
anomalous patterns of rating behaviour. Consequently, this approach is suitable for use in
rating systems where a text review is not provided.
1.2 Network analysis
In chapters 3 and 6 machine learning is applied to information-rich networks. The term
information-rich4 refers to networks that include multiple edge and vertex attributes describ-
ing the entities in the network and the relationships between them.
A key challenge in applying machine learning to information-rich networks is the develop-
ment of features that capture both structural and non-structural information. In chapter 3,
the structure of financial networks is represented through invariants such as diameter, girth,
clustering coe cient, etc., while information held in the network attributes is represented
through a separate set of features. Separating the structural and non-structural features
in this way provides a simple, easily calculated summary of the networks. However, this
approach fails to capture the relationships between local structural elements and attribute
values within these elements. In Chapter 6, an alternative method for generating network
features is explored, which attempts to capture some of the information held in these rela-
tionships.
4Alternatively, information network [57], heterogeneous information network [175], complex network [19],
or multi-dimensional network [200]
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1.3 Contrast pattern mining
Contrast patterns (also known as emerging patterns) are mined in order to identify significant
di↵erences between two contrasted sets of data. Contrast patterns are able to capture highly
discriminative information, and have previously been shown to be useful for wide range of
data analysis tasks, including exploratory analysis, supervised and unsupervised learning and
outlier detection [39, 46, 108, 197, 37]. Moreover, contrast patterns are easily interpretable,
providing a succinct, easily understandable description of the di↵erences between contrasted
sets. This makes contrast patterns particularly useful for mining illicit behaviours such
as money laundering, where analysts are expected to further investigate candidate cases.
Contrast patterns provide a clear indication of how the particular entity di↵ered from the
normal population, providing a starting point for further analysis.
To date, advances in contrast pattern mining have come in the form of highly-optimised
data-structures (e.g. [38, 46, 111]), additional constraints for pruning the search-space (e.g.
[198, 177]), or extensions to particular types of data (e.g. [94]). For sparse, relatively low
dimensional data, the resulting algorithms are extremely e cient; able to identify highly-
discriminating contrast patterns in a matter of seconds. However, existing algorithms are
designed to run in a sequential manner on a single machine. Consequently, these algorithms
do not have the scalability required for mining next-generation databases. With the growing
trend towards Big Data and cloud based systems, algorithms for contrast pattern mining must
be able to scale with the underlying system and be able to handle high density, high volume
and high dimensionality. Since existing algorithms are unable to meet these requirements,
there is a substantial need for development of new algorithms to meet ongoing demands.
There are two main challenges to mining contrast patterns in large databases, relating
to both the volume and the dimensionality of the database. First, high volume databases
are likely to be stored in a distributed fashion, typically optimised for use with distributed
analytics platforms based on map-reduce. Existing approaches for mining contrast patterns
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do not support these types of systems, relying on a global access to the underlying database.
Second, even if the target database sits on a single machine, high-dimensional databases are
likely to result in a search-space that is prohibitively large if processed in a sequential manner.
In mining for contrast patterns, dimensionality, rather than volume of records, determines
the size of the search-space. Small increases in dimensionality lead to large increases in the
number of possible patterns, greatly increasing the time required for mining to be completed.
In this thesis, both of these issues are addressed, and a novel algorithm is developed that
enables mining of contrast patterns to be performed in a distributed manner.
1.4 Overall contribution
The project was undertaken in collaboration with an industry partner, the Australian Trans-
action Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). As such, the models and algorithms de-
veloped are largely intended to address AUSTRAC’s specific capability requirements and
some of the outputs from this project are directly applicable within AUSTRAC’s intelligence
environment.
The specific contributions of this thesis include:
1. Development of a system for detecting suspicious communities in a financial network.
This system models transaction reports submitted to AUSTRAC as a typed, attributed
network and extracts communities from this network using a method that incorporates
AUSTRAC business knowledge. Supervised learning is then applied to detect com-
munities exhibiting suspicious behaviour. Evaluation of this system indicates that the
resulting classifier performs well and is able to identify suspicious communities with
high precision.
2. Development of a novel method for detecting opinion spam in online product reviews.
Previous methods for detecting opinion spam have focused on analysis of review text,
however text is not always available, and many review systems consider only numeric
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rating (e.g. 5-star rating systems). The developed method considers only ratings,
and applies statistical anomaly detection to identify reviewers with unusual rating be-
haviour. Evaluation indicates that this method is e↵ective in identifying spam reviews.
3. Design and implementation of a distributed algorithm for mining contrast patterns.
Contrast patterns are a valuable tool for knowledge discovery, describing the significant
di↵erences between related sets. However, existing methods are designed to run on
a single computing device, limiting their application to large data sets. As part of
this project, a novel algorithm has been developed which is capable of running on a
distributed system. Timing experiments with AUSTRAC data show that this algorithm
provides significant improvements over existing solutions and demonstrates a high level
of scalability.
4. Consideration of contrast patterns as a tool for network analysis. Contrast patterns
provide an extremely flexible tool for analysing sparse data, however previous applica-
tions have tended to focus on non-network problem domains. This thesis presents an
exploration contrast patterns as a tool for network analysis. This includes mapping of
networks to a suitable item-space that captures relationships between network struc-
ture and the information held in edge and vertex attributes. Experiments with real
data demonstrate the potential for using contrast patterns in this way.
1.5 Thesis structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.
• Chapter 2 provides a survey of related work. This chapter provides a detailed explo-
ration of the current state-of-the-art that serves as a basis, and point of comparison,
for the novel data mining algorithms and domain models presented in this thesis.
• Chapters 3 - 6 describe the major work undertaken as part of this thesis.
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• Chapter 7 provides an overall summary of the thesis, including suggestions for future
work.
• Appendix A presents a survey on anomaly detection in networks. This survey stems
from the work presented in Chapter 3, which considers analysis of networks using
supervised learning. Anomaly detection can be considered as an alternative approach
that is highly applicable to the money laundering problem domain. In order to better
understand this alternative approach, a survey of available literature was conducted.
Since this survey covers a broad range of issues outside the main topics of this thesis,
it is included as a separate appendix.
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2. Related work
This chapter provides a review of current literature related to the detection of money laun-
dering and opinion spam, and to contrast pattern mining.
2.1 Money laundering
Existing literature relating to money laundering research can be roughly divided into three
categories; (1) quantification, (2) evaluation and (3) methods for detection.
Category 1 consists of a large body of work devoted to quantifying the extent of money
laundering and it’s impacts on society (e.g. [183, 184, 160]). Within this category, there is
significant debate regarding the methods used and whether or not there is actually any value
in attempting to estimate the amounts laundered (e.g. [154, 105]).
Category 2 contains those studies that attempt to evaluate existing anti-money laundering
policies and programs (e.g. [112, 134, 34, 36, 119, 182]). Clearly, this work is closely related
to that in Category 1, as any evaluation must consider how these programs are reducing
the extent and impact of money laundering. This category contains significant criticism
of existing approaches (e.g. [112, 155]), suggesting that the cost imposed by anti-money
laundering regimes is disproportionate to the level of demonstrated success. In part, this
stems from the high diversity of channels available to criminals for laundering illicit funds;
attempts to closely monitor one channel may simply result in criminals switching to another
[179]. In addition, recent reports have criticised the strong focus on predicate crimes (i.e.
the crime that generates funds to be laundered), suggesting that resources may be better
allocated by focusing directly on detection of money laundering [34, 119].
Finally, Category 3 deals with the actual detection of money laundering by law-enforcement
and intelligence agencies. This includes studies of money laundering typologies (e.g. [11, 78,
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69]), emerging threats (e.g. [130, 20, 171]) and the use of computational techniques for au-
tomated detection (e.g. [88, 40, 58, 93, 89]). The work presented in this thesis falls within
this third category, contributing novel methods and algorithms for detection.
2.1.1 Automated detection
Traditionally, discovery of a predicate crime has often resulted in simultaneous discovery of
the mechanisms used for laundering the proceeds of these crimes. However, more recently,
these two aspects of organised crime have become increasingly separated (e.g. use of money
laundering syndicates [10]). In response, an increased emphasis has been placed on detecting
money laundering without knowledge of the predicate crime [48, 34]. Similarly, there is
an increased focus on terrorism financing, where the funds in question are an instrument
of crime, rather than the proceeds of crime. Consequently, detection of money laundering
per se has become a major goal for intelligence and law enforcement agencies [17]. Given
the volumes of data involved, data mining is seen as a necessary component of investigative
procedures [88, 89].
One of the earliest reports of an automated system for detecting money laundering applied
rule-based evaluation to identify suspicious parties [165]. The rules used by this system were
derived from expert knowledge and encoded in an evaluation module that was run each time
the target database was updated. Parties matching the provided rules would then be further
investigated by analysts using an interactive query interface and a variety of visualisation
tools provided by the system. More recently, Wang et al. have described an alternative
rules-based system, where rules are encoded using a decision tree [186].
While rule-based systems may be highly accurate, they are dependent on expert knowl-
edge, and cannot be used to uncover new typologies (i.e. modes of operation). Given the
wide variety of money laundering typologies, and the potential for rapid evolution, this is
a major drawback for these types of systems [56]. Later systems have addressed this issue
by applying more flexible approach based on a combination of supervised and unsupervised
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learning. Many of these systems follow a basic premise, first embraced by Kingdon [93],
which centres on the notion of ‘know your customer’ and the use of anomaly detection for
identifying money laundering behaviour.
In these later systems, two main contexts have been considered for deriving models of
normal, non-suspicious behaviour. The first context is provided by the transaction history
for a given party, while the second context is provided by sets of parties exhibiting similar
behaviour. In the original system described by Kingdon, grouping of parties into related sets
was based on a small number of superficial features such as the use of similar banking prod-
ucts, or sets of businesses providing the same service. Later systems have greatly improved
on this scheme, applying distance-based clustering across a far broader range of features (e.g.
[203, 88, 196, 152]).
In contrast to an anomaly detection approach, a number of systems apply supervised
learning to identify suspicious behaviour (e.g. [113, 71]). In general, these systems are
expected to provide a higher degree of precision than those based on anomaly detection, since
anomalous behaviour does not necessarily translate to money laundering activity. However,
unlike those based on anomaly detection, these systems can only identify suspicious behaviour
that is similar to that observed in previous investigations.
To date, the majority of systems reported in the literature have focused on individual
parties, considering amounts transacted, frequency of transactions, etc. However, more recent
studies have begun to adopt a network-based approach, considering features derived from the
structure of a transaction network.
For example, the system described in [41] uses role assignment to augment a more tra-
ditional approach based on anomaly detection (described in [42]). Using bank statements,
a social network is constructed with parties linked by transactions. For each party in the
network a number of invariants (betweenness centrality, page rank, etc.) are calculated. A
role is then assigned to the party depending on the values of these invariants. Examples of
roles include insulators, who act as a bu↵er between a core group of parties and the larger
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network, and communicators who act as a conduit for movement of funds between two oth-
erwise unconnected parties. Assigned roles are then taken into account when considering the
normality of a given parties transactions, with parties having the same role expected to show
similarities in their transaction histories.
Taking the structural considerations even further, the systems described in [15, 123] aim to
identify subgraphs within a network that closely match known typologies . In these systems,
the use of fuzzy matching means that subgraphs may deviate in some way from the given
typology, providing greater flexibility than a simple motif search.
2.2 Opinion spam
Previous approaches for detection of opinion spam have typically involved supervised or
unsupervised learning based largely on text-based features [72]. While many of these ap-
proaches include some non-text-based features, the major focus to date has been on features
such as n-gram counts and cosine similarity. Using these types of features, a wide variety
of supervised and semi-supervised classifiers have been described [106, 141, 109, 53]. These
classifiers are able to successfully identify spam with a high degree of accuracy, however,
in order to perform required training, these studies rely on manual labelling of reviews by
domain experts, which is a time-consuming and costly endeavour.
To overcome the di culties associated with manual labelling, an unsupervised approach
has been proposed that applies an unsupervised Bayesian framework to detection of opinion
spammers [131, 132]. In this framework, the spamicity of each reviewer is modelled as a
latent variable in a hierarchical model including both text- and non-text-based features.
Experiments with real data sets showed that this approach is able to accurately identify
opinion spammers, with posterior analysis suggesting that discrimination between spammers
and non-spammers is largely driven by text-based features. However, we note that this
posterior analysis also showed that rating deviation was an important aspect of spammer
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behaviour, and suggested that rating deviation may be more useful in separating spammers
from non-spammers than consideration of early reviews and reviews consisting of extreme
ratings.
While the vast majority of previous work has focused on text-based features, one excep-
tion is the FraudEagle algorithm [2], which has been shown to successfully detect of opinion
spammers using only product ratings. The FraudEagle algorithm uses a graph-based repre-
sentation of the product-review system, with reviews represented as edges between reviewers
and products. FraudEagle applies an iterative approach to spammer detection, whereby the
inter-dependency between perceived product quality and the spamicity of reviewers is re-
solved by updating scores for a given vertex, and then propagating this update along edges
in the graph, converging when the scores for each vertex becomes consistent with its neigh-
bours’ scores. A similar approach is also proposed in Wang et al. [185], however this study
deals with reviews of retail stores, which can change in quality over time, requiring the timing
of reviews to be taken into account by the detection algorithm.
In detecting opinion spammers, the FraudEagle algorithm relies on a set of parameters
describing the di↵erent behaviour of honest reviewers and spammers. These parameters are
di cult to estimate a priori, and are consequently set to arbitrary values [2]. In this the-
sis, a significantly di↵erent approach is taken to that of FraudEagle, which eliminates the
requirement for these parameters, and does not require a graph representation of the system.
Instead a binomial model of reviewer behaviour is fit to the target set of product ratings,
resulting in a more accurate representation of reviewer behaviour, and at the same time
greatly reducing the computational requirements.
In addition to those works focusing on opinion spam, related work is also found across a
wide range of problem domains through the shared use of statistical anomaly detection. For
example, statistical anomaly detection has previously been employed for detecting unusual
movement in crowds [95], network intrusion [45], spam phone calls through VoIP [86], and
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threats to operating system security [97]. A comprehensive review of anomaly detection in
general is given in Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar [26], with statistical anomaly detection
discussed alongside alternative methods. Similar approaches are also discussed by Markou
and Singh [117] in their review of statistical novelty detection.
2.3 Detection of illicit behaviour in networks
In recent years, network analysis has become an extremely active area of research [19],driven
in part by the significant increase in available network data. The digitisation of many forms of
communication, and advances in chemical and biological sciences, have led to masses of data
being generated that capture the various interactions between people, organisations, genes,
proteins, machines, etc. The availability of large data sets, and the desire to turn these into
useful, or marketable, information has led to the development of highly-detailed models and
an ability to identify complex behaviours representative of highly-specific concepts.
Network analysis has previously been applied to a number of problem domains that
constitute illicit behaviour. This includes detection spam [169], detection of sexual predators
in online social networks [49], anti-money-laundering and terrorism financing [41, 153, 96],
and detection of online fraud [142, 28]. Similarly, previous research has considered a broad
range of analysis techniques, including anomaly detection (see [6, 158] for current reviews),
and pattern / motif matching (e.g. [169, 49, 43, 44]).
2.3.1 Development of network features
In applying network analysis to the detection of illicit behaviour it is assumed that evidence
for the illicit behaviour is apparent in the network model (i.e. the manner in which enti-
ties are connected is somehow important). For example, evidence may take the form of a
distinguishing sub-structure (i.e. a specific subgraph) or a relationship between structural
and non-structural elements (i.e. entities with specific attributes are connected in a specific
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way). However, traditional data mining algorithms are unable to handle the extremely high
dimensionality of network objects. Thus a key challenge in applying network analysis is the
development of a mapping between the network and a lower dimensional feature space that
maintains a suitable level of detail regarding the network structure [158].
Clearly, the complexity of this mapping will depend on the particular application, and
the level of detail required for analysis. For example, a relatively simple mapping may
construct a feature space based on a small number of graph invariants (e.g. size, diameter,
transitivity, etc. [5, 114]). A more complex mapping may consider features that capture
complex relationships between the network structure and relevant attributes of the entities
and relationships being modelled (e.g. [41]).
As described in Savage et al. [158] (see Appendix A), the mapping from a network model to
a tractable feature space begins with a basic unit of analysis. For example, the work presented
in Chapter 3 considers k-step neighbourhoods as the basic unit of analysis. Alternative
units include connected components, communities (identified through traditional community
detection algorithms), cliques, dyads or triads, etc. Each instance of the basic unit are
mapped to the feature space, where they are represented as vectors that are suitable for
analysis using traditional methods.
A reasonably simple mapping from networks to a Euclidean feature space can be achieved
through the use of graph invariants. For example, Akoglu, McGlohon, and Faloutsos [5]
take ego-nets (1-step neighbourhoods) as a basic unit of analysis, and map these to a two-
dimensional feature space based on the number of parties and the number of edges. Within
this two-dimensional feature space, anomaly detection is applied to identify those ego-nets
exhibiting an unusual structure. Other invariants include the weight of ‘heavy edges’ [5], and
the ‘fine structure’ of the network captured by leadership, diversity and bonding [114].
A more complex mapping, which captures information relating to local structures, is the
use of subgraph features. Using subgraph features, each graph is described in terms of the
presence or absence of particular subgraphs. The subgraphs considered are typically identified
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through frequent subgraph mining (e.g. [163, 75, 172, 192, 24, 139]). This mining process
identifies a set of subgraphs that are likely to provide high discriminatory power within the
set of graphs to be analysed. As with graph invariants, subgraph features have previously
been used to embed networks as vectors in a Euclidean space, allowing distances between
graphs to be measured using a Euclidean metric.
For some forms of data mining, a non-Euclidean distance function may be specified as an
alternative to mapping the networks to a Euclidean space. One example of this is clustering
of networks based on their structure. Many clustering algorithms can be provided with a
custom distance function that, in this case, allows them to operate on higher-dimensional
objects. For example [164] develop a self-organising map that relies on edit-distance to update
neurons as a means of clustering simple networks. Related ideas are presented in [85, 73],
with di↵ering methods used to determine a local median network, which acts as a centroid,
and to iteratively shift neighbouring networks towards the closest median as measured by a
specified edit-distance. A review of di↵erent approaches to calculating edit-distances between
networks is given in [57].
2.4 Contrast pattern mining
Contrast patterns were introduced by Dong and Li in their seminal paper in 1999 [38]. Since
then, the utility of contrast patterns has been widely recognised, particularly their use for
building high-quality classifiers (e.g. [39, 46, 197]).
Dong and Li originally proposed to mine contrast patterns using set intervals for e cient
representation of large numbers of item-sets, and manipulation of interval borders to identify
contrast patterns. The main idea behind this approach is that intervals with highly di↵erent
borders contain contrast patterns. This approach was later advanced by Bailey et al. [13]
who used a tree-based structure to limit the transactions considered by each border-based
operation.
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A major limitation of border-based approaches is the need to perform two separate runs
to identify useful contrast patterns. For two data sets D1 and D2, these algorithms must
be run once to discover patterns from D1 to D2 (i.e. frequent in D1 and infrequent in
D2) and then again to discover patterns from D2 to D1. CP-Tree [46] was developed to
overcome this problem, adapting the FP-Tree data structure [66, 67] previously described
for e cient mining of frequent patterns in a single data-set (see Section 5.1 for di↵erences
between frequent and contrast patterns).
As an alternative to CP-Tree, zero suppressed binary decision diagrams (ZBDDs), have
also been proposed for use in mining contrast patterns [111]. The major advantage of ZBDDs
is their suitability for mining disjunctive as well as conjunctive contrast patterns. However,
mining using ZBBDs su↵er from the same limitation as earlier approaches, requiring two runs
to discover patterns from D1 to D2 and from D2 to D1. In this thesis, focus is on conjunctive
patterns, thus CP-Tree is used as the underlying data structure.
Contrast patterns are closely related to frequent patterns and the respective mining al-
gorithms share many similarities. Unlike contrast-patterns however, a number of parallel
algorithms for frequent pattern mining have been developed [80, 83, 104, 107, 129, 174, 201,
202]. Of particular interest is the PFP-Growth algorithm [107], which uses a map-reduce
framework to parallelise mining operations. Many of the related publications following PFP-
Growth represent variations addressing load balancing and the characteristics of particular
types of cluster architectures.
The main idea behind PFP-Growth is the fact that a set of transactions with sorted
items (forming a sequence of items) may be projected to a smaller subset by conditioning on
short su xes. Each projection may then be independently mined for frequent patterns [107].
Unfortunately, this same approach cannot be applied to mining of contrast patterns due to
di↵erences in the mining process.
Frequent pattern mining di↵ers from contrast pattern mining in the order that candi-
date patterns are generated and evaluated. Frequent pattern mining first considers patterns
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occurring as su xes, consisting of items that occur infrequently in the database. Longer
patterns are generated by adding successively higher frequency items (see Section 5.1 for
definitions). Projection of the database using these low-frequency su xes results in small,
largely disjoint, subsets of transactions. However, in mining for contrast patterns, the oppo-
site approach is taken, with patterns containing high-frequency items considered first, and
extensions to longer patterns made by adding lower frequency items [46]. This is a necessary
condition for e cient pruning of the search-space. Consequently, low-frequency su xes can-
not be used for projection because the resulting subsets cannot be mined independently. The
equivalent approach for contrast pattern mining would be to project using prefixes, however,
since prefixes contain high-frequency items, projection onto prefixes would result in large
overlapping subsets. In many cases the largest subsets would be only marginally smaller
than the full dataset. Consequently, projection in this manner would introduce a high-level
of redundancy, and require large amounts of data to be shu✏ed over the network. For this
reason an alternative approach to that used by PFP-Growth is required for distributed mining
of contrast patterns.
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3. Supervised learning for detection of suspi-
cious financial communities
This chapter describes an automated system for the detection of illicit behaviour indicative
of money laundering in financial data. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, money laundering re-
quires coordinated activity between multiple parties. Therefore, the system described in this
chapter takes a network-based approach, detecting suspicious groups, rather than suspicious
individuals or transactions.
The first part of this chapter describes the network model used to represent the AUSTRAC
data, and the process used to extract meaningful communities. The second part of this
chapter then describes the treatment of these communities as the basic unit of analysis for
supervised learning. This includes a description of the features used for learning and an
evaluation of a trained classifier.
3.1 Network model
3.1.1 Networks as graphs
Networks describe systems of interacting entities. Networks are typically represented using
a graph, which is a pair (V,E) where V is a set of vertices, representing the entities in the
system, and E is a set of edges, representing the relationships between these entities. Edges
are typically modelled as a pair of vertices, thus E ✓ V ⇥ V .
A network may take a bipartite structure, in which case the set of vertices may be par-
titioned into two subsets, V = V1 [ V2, V1 \ V2 = ;. Edges in a bipartite network occur only
between pairs of vertices where each vertex is in a di↵erent partition, E ✓ V1 ⇥ V2.
Depending on the modelling requirements, the entities and relationships in a network may
23
be be additionally described by some set of attributes (sometimes referred to as labels). In
this case the network is represented using a graph (V,E, FV , FE), where FV : V ! A maps
a vertex v 2 V to an attribute vector a 2 AV , and FE : E ! AE provides an equivalent
mapping from edges to some attribute space AE.
In practice the terms graph and network are used interchangeably, and this convention is
followed throughout this thesis.
3.1.2 AUSTRAC reports
AUSTRAC collects transaction reports from entities regulated under the Australian Anti-
Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism-Financing (AML/CTF) Act, 2006. This includes fi-
nancial institutions, other remittance providers, bullion dealers, and gambling service providers.
Three types of reports are considered in this thesis; those relating to deposits above a des-
ignated threshold (TTRs), international funds transfer instructions (IFTIs), and suspicious
matter reports (SMRs).
Each report (for the purposes of this thesis) includes a set of ordering customers, a set
of beneficiary customers, the amount transacted, and the transaction date. Reports also
contain information relating to the bank accounts used in the transaction and the details of
any identification presented by the ordering or beneficiary customers.
Transaction reports describe four di↵erent relationships between parties.
1. Reports describe the movement of funds between parties. Thus a pair of parties may
be linked by a transaction relationship, indicating that funds were transferred from one
of the parties to the other.
2. Reports may include multiple customers and multiple beneficiaries. This may occur, for
example, when an individual conducts a transaction as part of a businesses operations.
In this case, both the individual and the business will be listed as ordering customers.
3. Reports associate parties with supplementary evidence such as bank accounts and iden-
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tification (e.g. passports, licences, etc.). Thus a pair of parties may be linked through
a supplementary relationship, which indicates a shared use association with the sup-
plementary evidence. For example, a report may provide details of a transaction in
which party A transfers funds from account X. A second report may indicate that a
di↵erent party, B, also transferred funds from account X. In this case A and B are
linked through account X. Note that the recipient of these funds is irrelevant for the
purposes of defining the relationship between A and B.
4. Reports relating to threshold transactions (TTRs) may include an agent relationship,
where the agent party deposits funds on another’s behalf.
Given the fact that multiple parties may be connected through the same piece of evidence,
a bipartite structure is employed for the network model, with parties and evidence forming
the respective vertex types. Note that edges connecting parties to evidence are typed to
indicate the particular relationship (e.g. an agent relationship between a party and a TTR
report). Similarly, evidence vertices include a subtype attribute, indicating whether they
represent a report, an account, or identification. An example network is given in Figure 3.1,
showing each of the possible edge and vertex types.
3.1.3 Financial communities as near-k-step neighbourhoods
Money laundering involves multiple transactions between di↵erent parties. For this reason,
there is significant interest in identifying small sets of interacting parties whose collective
behaviour is suspicious. Since the system described in this thesis employs supervised learning,
small groups of interacting parties must be extracted from the larger network and treated
as observations. There are two main-options for this, community detection (top-down) or
an ego-centric approach (bottom-up) based on k-step neighbourhoods. For our particular
purposes, existing community detection algorithms (see [51] for a comprehensive review)
su↵er from a number of issues, leaving the ego-centric approach as the favoured option.
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Figure 3.1: Example financial network with bipartite structure. Each circle represents
a di↵erent party, and each square represents a transaction, with di↵erent colours showing
the di↵erent transaction types. Coloured edges are used to distinguish the various roles for
parties involved in transactions.
A major drawback of existing methods is that they often result in excessively large com-
munities [102, 99]. In general, meaningful communities are thought to contain less than 150
individuals [102, 7], and published typologies indicate that investigation of money laundering
operations often focuses on a relatively small number of key parties [11]. Using traditional
community detection algorithms, smaller communities tend to be found only at the extrem-
ities of a network [102, 99]. Typically, these communities consist of entities that have only
recently been added to the network. However, within the core of the network, where the
vast majority of interactions take place, many of the detected communities are exceedingly
large. For this reason, we take an ego-centric approach, building communities as a bottom-up
process.
To avoid the large communities resulting from community detection algorithms, com-
munities in the presented system are defined using a bottom up approach. As part of this
process, the bipartite network described in Section 3.1.2 is projected onto the party vertices.
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The resulting graph is then simplified, so that a pair of parties may be connected only by a
single weighted edge. Figure 3.2 demonstrates this process for an example network.
Weights for projected edges are calculated based on the following assumptions.
1. Links through transaction reports are more important than links through supplemen-
tary evidence
2. Supplementary evidence that is shared by many di↵erent parties is weak evidence
3. Parties that are associated with many pieces of supplementary evidence have weak links
to other parties
4. The strength of a link between two parties is decided by the weaker association with
the relevant evidence
Edge weights are calculated as a two step process. First the strength of a relationship
between two parties p1, p2 through each linking piece of evidence e is calculated. This step
corresponds to the projection from the bipartite network to a party to party network, so that
e corresponds to a node in the bipartite network, and to one or more edges in the projected
network. Weights for edges resulting from the projection of e are calculated as follows. If e
is a report, then wp1,p2,e = 1, otherwise wp1,p2,e = min(wp1,e, wp2,e) where
wpi,e =
1
d(pi)(d(e)  1)
Here d(pi) is the number of pieces of supplementary evidence that pi is associated with and
d(e) is the number of parties associated with e. The value wpi,e may be interpreted as the
smallest probability that a two-step random walk beginning from p1 would traverse evidence
e and finish at p2, or begin at p2 traverse through e and finish at p1.
For the second step, projected edges are summarised as a single link for each connected
pair of parties. The aggregated weight for this summarised edge is calculated as
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A B C
Figure 3.2: Projection and simplification of bipartite financial network. (A) Bipartite
network. (B) Projection onto parties. (C) Simplification to weighted edges, representing the
strength of the relationship based on the number of transactions, and the number of shared
accounts, identification, etc.
wp1,p2 =
1
|E|
X
e2E
wp1,p2,e
where E denotes the set of evidence shared by p1 and p2. The value of wp1,p2 represents the
average strength of the connections between p1 and p2.
If the weight wp1,p2 is smaller than a specified threshold, denoted wmin, the link is removed
from the network. In this case the evidence supporting the link is not considered strong
enough, and should not be considered in further analysis.
3.1.3.1 Extraction of financial communities
Using the projected network, communities are extracted as near-k-step neighbourhoods. A
k-step neighbourhood is obtained by selecting a subject party p0 (also referred to as the seed)
and all parties having a distance of k or less from this seed (i.e. there is a path from the
subject p0 to the candidate party p containing k or less edges). The subgraph induced by
these parties is the k-step neighbourhood. We say near-k-step, as two additional constraints
are applied beyond that imposed by the parameter k. These additional constraints further
limit the parties and relationships included in the neighbourhood.
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Figure 3.3: Overview of community extraction process.
This allows us to remove low quality/confidence transactional links (for the purpose of
financial community extraction).
The first constraint is controlled by a parameter, Nmax, which gives the maximum num-
ber of transaction neighbours for a party (i.e. the maximum number of parties that have
conducted at least one transaction with the subject, note that this is not the degree of the
corresponding vertex). Parties having a number of neighbours that exceeds this threshold
are treated as gates. Unless linked to other parties within the k-step neighbourhood, the
transaction neighbours of these parties are not included in the community. This allows low
quality report based links to be removed prior to community extraction. For example, where
many parties have transacted with a large retailer but are otherwise unrelated. The second
constraint parameter, wmin, gives the minimum weight for supplementary edges to be in-
cluded in the community. Note that each of these parameters may be specified as a vector
of dimension k, so that constraints may vary with distance from the subject party. Figure
3.3 shows a schematic overview of the community detection process.
For the purposes of this thesis parameters were set to k = 3, Nmax = 40, and wmin = 0.01.
These values were selected in consultation with domain experts. In particular, reasoning for
taking k  3 stems from the fact that vast majority of transactions in the network are
international transfers. By considering up to 3 steps, a seed party in the source country
is obtained, along with associated parties in the destination country, additional parties in
the source country transacting with these same associates, and finally, related parties in the
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destination country. In other words, if k = 3 then parties in both the source and destination
countries are obtained that are not directly associated, but are linked through a third party.
As shown in Figure 3.3, extraction of communities is achieved by first splitting the net-
work into discrete connected components. Those components that are below a threshold
size (diameter  2k) are treated as communities, with no need to extract the near-k-step
neighbourhoods. For those components having size greater than the specified threshold, near-
k-step neighbourhoods are extracted for any subject parties within the component (selection
of subject parties is described in Section 3.2.2). This process is implemented using a parallel
architecture, allowing millions of communities to be extracted in short period of time.
Treatment of communities as near-k-step neighbourhoods can introduce a significant de-
gree of overlap between communities. From an intelligence standpoint, this is a useful char-
acteristic of our approach, as it means the classifier is exposed to numerous views of the same
underlying signal, placed within a di↵erent context. When assessing a new community, train-
ing in this way will mean that the classifier is able to correctly identify suspicious activity
even if it is only seeing a small portion of the relevant transactions. One drawback however,
is that multiple overlapping communities may be classified as suspicious, and steps must be
taken so that analysts are not presented with large numbers of highly similar networks.
For example, suppose that two transactions occur within a short time frame, and that
these transactions involve parties whose distance from one another in the network is less than
three. For each transaction, a community is extracted using the sending party as the seed.
However, since the parties involved are less than three steps from each other, the resulting
communities will overlap. If both of these communities are classified as suspicious then
without intervention they would both be passed to an analyst (or to two di↵erent analysts)
for further investigation. Clearly this situation is undesirable, thus a post-processing step
may be employed, which evaluates the degree of overlap between communities deemed to be
suspicious. For example, if the overlap is above a certain threshold, then the union of the
communities could be taken, and this result could then be passed to an analyst.
30
category description
Demographic Aggregate features describing parties in the net-
work (e.g. mean age)
Network Invariants describing the network structure (e.g.
transitivity)
Transaction Aggregations over transactions included in the
community (e.g. total cash amount)
Dynamic Features derived from time-series analysis (e.g.
num. unusually high amounts)
Table 3.1: Feature categories.
3.2 Supervised learning applied to financial communities
This chapter describes the outcome of machine learning performed on a set of financial
communities. The main purpose of this is to assess the viability of a monitoring system
based on machine learning and the previously described network model.
3.2.1 Description of features
Machine learning was undertaken using a broad set of features derived from extracted commu-
nities. Design of this feature set was guided by expert knowledge (AUSTRAC, unpublished
data), and a broad survey of literature related to detection of illicit behaviour and to gen-
eral network analysis. This feature set was designed to represent di↵erent aspects of the
transaction network, with features divided into four main categories, as shown in Table 3.1.
Calculation of dynamic features includes the use of burst analysis, which provides an
indication of transaction regularity and is used to identify abnormal behaviour. A wavelet-
based algorithm was used for this, which has previously been shown to outperform alternative
algorithms in detecting both local and global bursts [187].
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3.2.2 Evaluation
Evaluation of the system was performed using a subset of AUSTRAC’s financial transaction
reports. Note that this evaluation only considers the performance of the proposed system.
Comparisons with other systems designed to identify money laundering activity are not
possible, since the details of such systems are not publicly available.
Supervised learning was undertaken using a support vector machine (SVM) and a random
forest, as implemented in the R libraries e1071 and randomForest, respectively. For the
SVM we considered a linear and polynomial kernel, using default values for the respective
parameters. For the random forest we set the number of trees to one hundred and used
default values for all other parameters.
Since the total number of communities that could be extracted from the transaction
network is extremely large, training and evaluation was undertaken using a sample of the full
set. This sampling, and the assignment of labels, was undertaken as follows.
For the labelled true positives, a set of parties was provided by AUSTRAC as examples of
suspicious behaviour. The neighbours of these parties were then identified in the transaction
network. The provided parties and their neighbours were treated as positive seeds. For the
labelled true negatives, a uniform random sample (without replacement) was taken from
the remaining parties. Near-k-neighbourhoods were then extracted for each of the positive
and negative seeds. Resulting communities were then assigned the same label as their seed.
Note that in certain situations, this process can result in duplicate communities, thus a
post-processing step was employed to remove these duplicates.
To obtain a robust estimate of classifier performance, a method similar to k-fold cross
validation was employed. In each of the k evaluations, the full set of positive labelled com-
munities was combined this with a randomly sampled (without replacement) set from the
negative communities. For each of the k iterations, the resulting set was randomly partitioned
into training and evaluation sets, with 70% of the observations used for training and 30%
used for evaluation. In each iteration the F-score was calculated using three values for the
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of size for extracted communities.
weighting factor,  1 = 0.1,  2 = 0.5,  3 = 1. These values were selected as we are interested
in the ability of the classifier to achieve a high-precision. An ROC curve was also calculated
in each iteration and a parameter ⌧ was determined from this curve giving the threshold
value for classifier scores that maximised the F-score for a given value of  . Precision and
recall were then calculated for this value of ⌧ . Mean performance in F-score, precision, recall
and area under the ROC curve was then calculated across the k iterations.
3.2.2.1 Financial communities
After removing duplicates, a total of 758, 271 communities were extracted from the network.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of size (number of parties) for extracted communities.
Additional statistics are provided in Table 3.2. As shown in Figure 3.4, the vast majority of
extracted communities have more than 5 and less than 50 parties.
3.2.3 Classifier performance
Table 3.3 gives the mean performance for a set of classifiers evaluated using the sampling
process described in Section 3.2.2, taking k = 10. Example ROC curves are shown for a
classifier of each model type. The results shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5 indicate that
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total positive 69, 328 (all positive)
total negative 688, 943 (random sample)
mean num. parties 33
mean num. supplementary rela-
tionships
47
mean num. transactions 124
mean diameter 3.5
Table 3.2: Community statistics.
model AUC   ⌧ F-score recall precision
random forest 0.92 0.1 0.93 0.96 0.31 0.98
0.5 0.68 0.86 0.73 0.90
1.0 0.47 0.85 0.88 0.82
SVM 0.86 0.1 0.89 0.90 0.22 0.93
0.5 0.63 0.80 0.70 0.83
1.0 0.32 0.80 0.87 0.74
Table 3.3: Mean performance of random forest classifiers over ten samples. Each random
forest consisted of 100 trees. Parameters   and ⌧ refer to the weighting used in the calculation
of F-scores and threshold used for classification, respectively.
both the random forest and SVM classifiers are able to achieve a level of performance that is
suitable for use in a live environment. The random forest gives slightly better performance.
While the average recall of the classifiers is quite low, both models exhibit an extremely
high precision. This means that a high classification threshold (⌧) can be selected, so that
the classifier can operate with low rates of false positives. This is an important characteristic
for real-world application of our system, as any communities classified as suspicious will be
further investigated by human analysts. Since this is a time-consuming task, only minimal
levels of false-negatives can be tolerated.
3.3 Summary
This chapter has described an automated system for detecting money laundering operations
in transaction networks. This system advances the current state-of-the-art by analysing both
explicit transaction relationships and implicit relationships derived from supplementary in-
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Figure 3.5: ROC curve for random forest
and SVM classifiers.
formation. The system extracts small, meaningful communities from this network in manner
that allows existing business knowledge to be considered in the process. Supervised learning
is then applied to these communities to obtain trained classifiers. Evaluation of the system
shows that a suitable level of accuracy is achieved at high levels of precision. This is an
important characteristic for our system, as use in a live environment necessitates a low rate
of false positives.
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4. Detection of opinion spam through anoma-
lous rating deviation
This chapter presents a novel method for detecting opinion spammers attempting to manip-
ulate mean ratings. This method significantly di↵ers from previous approaches in two main
ways. First, the presented method characterises reviewer behaviour in a manner that allows
detection of opinion spammers using only ratings, without resorting to text-based analy-
sis. Second, a binomial model is fit to the set of reviews for each candidate reviewer, and
spammers are identified as those reviewers exhibiting anomalous behaviour under this model.
Consequently, the method accurately reflects the observed patterns of reviewer behaviour for
the particular system under consideration, rather than relying on assumed parameter values
describing this behaviour.
To demonstrate the utility of our approach experiments were conducted using both real
and synthetic data. These experiments show that the presented method can successfully
identify opinion spammers. As part of these experiments, comparisons are made with the
FraudEagle algorithm presented in [2], which is also capable of detecting opinion spammers
based only on ratings. FraudEagle has previously been shown to outperform alternative ap-
proaches and can therefore be considered the current state of the art for detection of the type
of spammer discussed in this chapter. Using a combination of real and synthetic data the
presented approach is demonstrated to achieve a similar level of performance to FraudEa-
gle while providing a conceptually deeper, but computationally simpler, characterisation of
spammer behaviour.
Please note that the presented approach considers deviation in ratings from the majority
opinion. As discussed in section 4.1, the mean rating is used as a measure of majority opinion,
as this is the measure most often shown to consumers. However, alternative measures of
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majority opinion have previously been studied in the context of decision making and decision
theory (see for example Pasi and Yager [145] and Van´ıcˇek, Vrana, and Aly [181]).
4.1 Detection of opinion spammers through considera-
tion of majority opinion
The proposed method for detecting opinion spammers stems from two overarching assump-
tions regarding reviewer behaviour. (1) The majority of reviews are posted by honest review-
ers, and as a consequence, distributions taken over large samples of the reviewer population
will overwhelmingly reflect the behaviour of honest reviewers. (2) Honest reviewers will typ-
ically have similar expectations and perceptions of quality, such that the set of reviews for a
given product will tend to exhibit a small degree of variance.
Assumption 1 is taken as given, since if this is not the case then the whole system of
online peer reviews is completely broken. As justification for assumption 2, Figure 4.1 shows
the distribution of the standard deviation, and also the maximum deviation from the mean
rating over approximately 272,000 products reviewed in the Amazon online store. For the
majority of products, review scores appear to be relatively tightly clustered around the mean,
rather than spread across the possible range of 5 stars.
Based on Figure 4.1, it is suggested that honest reviewers tend to come to a similar
opinion about a product, so that reviews that disagree with the mean rating will be relatively
infrequent. Clearly such reviews may exist for legitimate reasons, for example the purchaser
may happen to receive a defective version of an otherwise quality product, or a particular
book or film generates a highly polarised response. However, it is unlikely that the same
purchaser will consistently receive faulty models or review polarising products. Therefore,
it is reasonable to suggest that having a high proportion of reviews that disagree with the
mean rating is a strong indicator that a reviewer may be a spammer.
Consider a product p targeted by an opinion spammer (or a group of opinion spammers),
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of maximum and standard deviation from the mean rating for the
Amazon data set.
who wishes to influence the average rating of the product. In manipulating the average rating,
the spammer attempts to create an overall perception of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction
on the part of previous purchasers. Assuming a 5-star rating system, this manipulation can
be modelled by taking the midpoint rating   = 3, and assuming that products having a
mean rating  p   3 will be perceived as good while those having  p < 3 will be perceived
as bad. The spammers objective is to drive the mean rating in a particular direction so
that the product in question will be perceived as good or bad by prospective purchasers.
For a given reviewer r, a published rating  r,p can be considered as agreeing ( r,p   3 and
 p   3 or  r,p < 3 and  p < 3) or disagreeing ( r,p   3 and  p < 3 or  r,p < 3 and  p   3)
with the majority opinion. Note that a 5-star system is assumed in this chapter, however
the presented method could equally be applied to a binary system, taking   = 0.5 as the
midpoint and considering a mean rating  p   0.5 indicative of a good product and  p < 0.5
as indicative of a bad product. Depending on the particular situation,   may also be set to
an alternative value. For example, a value of   = 3.5 may be considered as the point where
consumers become far more likely to purchase particular products. Alternatively, it may be
assumed that spammers are willing to post ratings of 3-stars in order to negate 5-star ratings
of a product, attempting to drag the mean rating down without being too obvious. In this
case, a value of   = 4 may be used so that these types of spammers would still be detected.
For the purposes of this thesis, the mean rating is considered as the measure of majority
opinion. This is because the mean rating is displayed to consumers in many online stores (e.g.
Amazon, Apple App Store, Google Play, see also Chevalier and Mayzlin [32]). It is therefore
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reasoned that spammers’ manipulation of consumer perception requires them to alter the
mean rating. For a particular situation, consideration of alternative measures, such as the
median rating, may be beneficial. As described below, the presented approach considers
a weighted mean, thus alternative measures that can be naturally weighted can be easily
substituted.
Using the rating model outlined above, the proportion of reviews for a given reviewer r
that disagree with the mean rating for their respective products can be determined. Whether
or not this proportion is considered to be excessive depends on how often a random honest
reviewer is expected to post such a review. Since the overwhelming majority of reviewers
are assumed to be honest, an estimate of this frequency can be easily calculated from the
available data by considering the proportion of reviews that disagree with the mean rating
across all available observations   = nD/n. Taking   as the probability that a random review
 r,p will disagree with the mean, the spamicity for each reviewer can be estimated using a
binomial distribution.
A binomial distribution models the outcome of independently repeating a random process
a set number of times, where the random process results in a binary value success or failure.
The distribution can be used to determine whether or not the observed proportions of success
and failure across the repeated trials di↵er significantly from the expected proportions, given
a known probability of obtaining success. In applying the binomial distribution to opinion
spam, the number of reviews posted by a given reviewer nr is treated as the number of trials,
and the number of reviews that disagree with the mean rating kr is treated as the number
of trials having an outcome sucess. The probability  r of observing kr or more disagreeing
reviews out of nr by random chance alone can then be calculated, taking   as the probability
of success.
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 r = P (X   kr;nr, )
= 1  P (X < kr;nr, )
=
kr 1X
i=0
✓
nr
i
◆
 i(1   )nr i
The value of  r is considered to be a measure of the reviewers honesty. A value of  r that
is close to one indicates that the proportion of disagreeing reviews is within the expected
bounds, while a value close to zero indicates that the proportion of disagreeing reviews
is unexpectedly high. An estimate of the reviewers spamicity can then be calculated as
sr = 1   r.
In calculating the number of reviews that disagree with the majority it is important to
remember that the mean rating reflects both the contributions by honest reviewers, and the
deliberate manipulations by spammers. If a spammer successfully drives the mean rating
above or below the midpoint, then honest reviewers would appear to disagree with the ma-
jority opinion, and may consequently be considered by the algorithm as candidate spammers
[2, 190]. To correct for this situation an iterative process is applied, whereby the contribution
from each reviewer to the average rating for each product is successively reduced based on
their proportion of non-majority reviews.
The iterative process used for correcting mean ratings begins by assuming that all reviewers
are honest, and defining ur,i to be an estimated measure of whether reviewer r is honest (i.e.
not a spammer) derived from the ith iteration. For each reviewer, ur,0 = 1 is taken as the
initial value. In each iteration i > 1 the mean rating  p,i for each product p is calculated as
a weighted arithmetic mean, with the contribution of each rating weighted using the values
of ur,i 1 from the previous iteration. Using this updated mean rating, the weights for the
next iteration ur,i are calculated as ur,i = 1  dr,inr where dr,i refers to the number of reviews
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for reviewer r that disagree with the weighted mean rating for the respective products in
iteration i and nr is the total number of reviews published by that reviewer. The iterative
process stops when a maximum number of loops have occurred or the observed change in
the proportion of non-majority reviews becomes less than some threshold ⌧ for all reviewers.
Once the iterative process is complete, a binomial test is applied to each reviewer as described
above.
For the experiments described in this chapter, a value of ⌧ = 1 ⇥ e 5 was used for
the threshold parameter and a maximum number of 10 iterations were performed. It was
found that 10 iterations were enough for the algorithm to e↵ectively correct mean ratings,
and convergence was often achieved well before reaching this maximum. However, in some
situations, updating the estimated honesty score for a small number of reviewers caused the
weighted means of some products to flip back and forth from > 3 to < 3. Consequently, the
proportion of reviews that disagree with the majority did not converge for these reviewers,
and the maximum number of iterations was reached.
A step-by-step description of the presented approach is given as Algorithm 4.1. Lines
3   13 relate to the iterative process used to correct the mean rating. Lines 5   7 calculate
the weighted mean for each product, and lines 9 12 calculate the proportion of reviews that
disagree with this updated mean. Lines 15  18 relate to the assignment of a spamicity score
using the binomial test.
The presented algorithm scales linearly as a function of the number of reviewers and the
number of reviews, O(imax(nreviews + nreviewers) + nreviewers), where imax is the number of
iterations completed. Although the mean rating is calculated for each product, the total
number of operations is dependent on the number of reviews for each of these products, thus
this part of the algorithm scales with the number of reviews. The proportion of non-majority
reviews is then calculated, meaning the number of operations depends on the number of
reviewers. Since an iterative process is employed, the number of operations is multiplied by
the number of iterations. Finally, the number of operations required for the binomial test is
41
added, and this is also a function of the number of reviewers.
Memory required to run the presented algorithm also scales linearly with the number of
reviewers, the number of reviews and the number of products. For each reviewer, the algo-
rithm maintains the current and previous proportion of disagreeing reviews ur,i and ur,i 1.
The algorithm also needs to maintain the score for each review, and the mean score for each
product. Thus the space complexity of the algorithm is O(2nreviewers + nreviews + nproducts).
4.2 Evaluation
Evaluation of the proposed method included comparison with the recently proposed FraudEa-
gle algorithm [2] and application to a real data set consisting of product reviews published
on Amazon.com. The FraudEagle algorithm is a network-based approach to the detection of
opinion spam that considers network structure as well as rating scores as part of an iterative
message passing algorithm. FraudEagle has been evaluated against synthetic and real data
sets, and has been shown to outperform a number of similar network-based approaches.
4.2.1 Comparison with FraudEagle using synthetic data
FraudEagle models product reviews as a bipartite graph, with reviewers and products rep-
resented as vertices and reviews as edges linking reviewers to products. Reviews of products
are assumed to have a binary rating, good or bad. Products are similarly given a binary label,
good or bad, depending on the number of good and bad reviews. FraudEagle also assigns a
binary label to each reviewer, being either honest or fraudulent. FraudEagle takes a set of a
parameters describing the probability that a reviewer with a given label will give a good or
bad review of a product that is inherently good or bad (e.g. the probability that an honest
reviewer will give a good product a bad review). FraudEagle applies an iterative message
passing algorithm, whereby the labels on products and reviewers are updated in a manner
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1 Function Binomial Detection
input : reviewers, products, reviews,  , ↵, ⌧ , maxIterations
output: For each reviewer r, a spamicity score sr
2 foreach r 2 reviewers do
3 ur,0  1// Assume all reviewers are honest
4 end
5 for i in [1,maxIterations] do
6 foreach p 2 products do
// Calculate the weighted mean
7 Rp  reviewers(p);
8  p  
P
r2Rp
 r,pur,i
|Rp| ;
9 end
10 foreach r 2 reviewers do
// Calculate proportion of disagreeing reviews
11 dr,i  count( r,p 2 reviews(r);  r,p < 3 ^  p,i   3 _  r,p   3 ^  p,i < 3);
12 ur,i  1  dr,inr
13 end
// Break if convergence is achieved
14 if |ur,i 1   ur,i| < ⌧ 8i then
15 break ;
16 end
17 end
18 forall the reviewers r do
19 kr  count( r,p 2 reviews(r);  r,p < 3 ^  p   3 _  r,p   3 ^  p < 3);
20  r  P (X   kr;nr, );
// Apply the binomial test
21 sr  1  pr;
22 end
Algorithm 4.1: Algorithm for detecting opinion spammers from review ratings in a 5-star
system. Inputs for the algorithm are the set of products, reviewers and reviews in the
form of product ratings, a required significance level for the binomial test ↵, the maximum
number of iterations to be run, and the tolerance threshold ⌧ for terminating the iterative
process. Outputs are a p-value (probability reviewer is honest) for each reviewer and a
label honest or spammer based on the calculated p-value and the given significance level
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that maximises the likelihood of the network configuration (i.e. which reviewers and products
have which labels) under the given probabilities. In this way, FraudEagle also considers de-
viation from majority opinion and attempts to discount the contribution of likely spammers.
See Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos [2] for further details.
To compare the presented approach with FraudEagle, two synthetic data sets were gener-
ated, using two di↵erent models of spammer behaviour. Since FraudEagle considers product
reviews as a bipartite graph, these data sets were generated using a random graph generator,
RTG [4]. FraudEagle has been previously evaluated using synthetic data produced using
RTG, thus RTG was seen as a suitable generator for the comparison. Using RTG two sets
of random bipartite graphs were generated, and for each graph a rating score for each edge
(vi, vj) was also generated, representing a review of product j by reviewer i. In generating
these ratings two di↵erent models of spammer behaviour were applied (described below),
giving two test sets of synthetic data. For both of these test sets, the presented approach
and the FraudEagle algorithm were applied to all graphs, combining the results within each
set. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was then calculated for both sets, and
the area under the curve (AUC) used as a metric for performance.
In the context of this chapter, the false positive rate for the ROC curve refers to honest
reviewers that are misidentified as spammers, while the true positive rate refers correctly
identified spammers. Both the presented approach and FraudEagle calculate a spamicity
score for each reviewer, and reviewers having a spamicity score above some threshold are
assumed to be spammers. By varying this threshold, di↵erent false positive rates and true
positive rates may be achieved. The ROC curve shows the e↵ect of varying this threshold
on the accuracy of each approach. For a given rate of false positives (misidentified honest
reviewers), the ROC curve shows the expected rate of true positives (correctly identified
spammers). In attempting to counter opinion spam, the cost of false positives is likely to be
higher than false negatives, as flagging accounts honest reviewers as spam is likely to cause
o↵ence and significant public backlash. Consequently, performance at a low rate of false
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positives is important for detection of opinion spam.
Each of the synthetic test sets used for evaluation consisted of 30 random bipartite graphs
generated using RTG. Multiple graphs were generated for each data set to minimise the
possibility of skewed results stemming from the use of a random process. Previous evaluation
of the FraudEagle algorithm also used RTG generator, and the same parameter values were
used for this comparison; W = 5000, k = 5, q = 0.4 and   = 0.6 (see Akoglu, Chandy,
and Faloutsos [2] and Akoglu and Faloutsos [4] for details). The mean edge count for the
resulting graphs was 1359. For each of the 30 graphs, the 7 products with the highest degree
were deemed to be ‘famous’. The purpose of the famous products was to simulate spammers
attempts to disguise their behaviour by publishing honest reviews of well known products.
For the first test set, spammer behaviour was modelled using the same process outlined
in Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos [2]. In each graph the inherent value of all products was
assigned to be ‘good’ and then 4 reviewers were randomly selected to represent spammers.
Ratings posted by the selected spammers were set to ‘bad’ unless the review happened to
be directed towards one of the famous products, in which case it was set to ‘good’. For the
remaining reviewers, deemed to be honest, all ratings were set to ‘good’.
For the second test set an alternative model of spammer behaviour was applied, which
was felt to be a more realistic representation of spammer behaviour. For this test set the
distribution of ratings from the available set of Amazon product reviews was calculated, and
a random rating was sampled for each edge in each graph using this distribution to represent
the generated reviews. After rating scores had been sampled for all edges, five reviewers
were randomly selected to represent spammers, and the ratings for these five reviewers were
flipped, so that, for example, an initial rating of 5 would be transformed to a 1, a rating of
2 would be transformed to 4, while a rating of 3 would remain unchanged. It was reasoned
that flipping the scores in this way would simulate spammers posting reviews that attempt to
drive the average rating away from the majority opinion. Because FraudEagle only considers
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a binary rating system we treated ratings of  r,p   3 to be ‘good’ and ratings of  r,p < 3 to
be ‘bad’ as described in Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos [2].
For each of the test sets the iterative process was run on each network. The binomial
test was then performed to obtain a spamicity score for each reviewer. FraudEagle was also
run for each network in each test set. Within each results from all 30 graphs were combined,
giving two sets of spamicity scores, one for each test set. For each of these two sets an ROC
curve was calculated based on the spamicity scores reported by the presented approach and
by FraudEagle.
Results of the comparison with the FraudEagle algorithm are given in Figure 4.2, showing
the respective ROC curves. These results show that the presented approach out-performed
FraudEagle on both sets of synthetic data, achieving a higher AUC. While this improvement
over FraudEagle is marginal for both data sets, the comparison clearly demonstrates the
viability of the presented approach, particularly considering the simplicity of this approach
compared to the FraudEagle algorithm. Note also that the ROC curve shows that presented
approach achieves a high rate of true positives for low rates of false positives; an important
characteristic given the high cost of false positives in detection of opinion spam.
4.2.2 Application to Amazon product reviews
The Amazon product review data set was downloaded from http://liu.cs.uic.edu/download/
data/ (password required, a link is provided on this page to obtain access, please see Jin-
dal and Liu [84]). After removing all reviews with missing fields, this data set consists of
5,838,041 reviews of 1,230,915 products, published by a total of 2,146,057 reviewers.
To ensure that the data contained a reasonable set of connected reviewers and products,
a bipartite network was constructed from the product review data and the largest connected
component was extracted. All reviewers having less than 3 or more than 5000 reviews and
all products having only a single review or more than 1000 reviews were then removed from
this component. It was reasoned that reviewers having more than 5000 reviews are already
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Figure 4.2: ROC for the presented approach (blue, solid) and FraudEagle (red, dashed)
applied to synthetic data sets using two di↵erent models of spammer behaviour. The left panel
represents a binary review system where all products are good, honest reviewers always give
good ratings and spammers always give bad ratings unless reviewing a ‘famous’ product. The
AUC is 0.964 for our approach and 0.940 for FraudEagle. The panel on the right represents
behaviour where honest review ratings were drawn from the global distribution and spammer
review ratings were then flipped so that any ratings greater than 3 were transformed to be
less than 3 and vice versa. The AUC is 0.992 for our approach and 0.975 for FraudEagle.
somewhat suspicious and those having less than 3 reviews require di↵erent methods to de-
tect (e.g. clusters of single positive review, see [190]). For products having more than 1000
reviews, the mean rating is less likely to be strongly influenced by fake reviews. Products
having a single review obviously prevent any deviation from the majority. After removing
products, some reviewers can become orphaned, therefore reviewers having zero reviews were
removed as a final pre-processing step. The final data set consisted of 5,018,344 reviews of
570,606 products by 1,859,242 reviewers.
To evaluate the performance of the presented approach, the iterative process described
in section 4.1 was run on the Amazon data set. The binomial test was then applied using
a significance value of ↵ = 0.05, and those reviewers having a significant number of non-
majority reviews were selected as candidate spammers. Since the test is applied multiple
times (once for each reviewer), Bonferonni correction was applied to the significance level,
↵ = 0.05/nreviewers. After applying the binomial test the candidate spammers were further
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filtered by removing those candidates having more than 50 reviews. This process resulted in
187 reviewers being identified as candidate spammers.
Evaluation of candidate spammers was performed by considering a set of alternative fea-
tures shown in other studies to be strong indicators of opinion spam [84, 131, 132, 2]. This
included features relating to content similarity (repeated review text), numerous extreme
ratings (1-star or 5-star), and posting of multiple reviews on the same day. Note that calcu-
lation of content similarity is possible in the Amazon data-set, but in many rating systems
review text would not be present and this feature could not be relied on for identification of
spammers.
Figure 4.3 shows the aggregate behaviour of reviewers for the alternative features, taken
across a random sample of reviewers (panel A) and the 187 candidate spammers identified
by our approach (panel B). Also shown is the p-values resulting from a proportional test,
described in detail below. This p-value indicates the statistical significance of the di↵ering be-
haviour between the random sample of reviewers and those reviewers identified as spammers
using the presented approach.
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Figure 4.3: Aggregate behaviour of random spammers (A) and candidate spammers iden-
tified using deviation from majority opinion (B), with p-values indicating the significance of
observed di↵erences between the two groups (C). The dashed line in (C) indicates a signifi-
cance of 0.05. Features considered measure reviewers tendency to post reviews on the same
day, use of extreme ratings, and degree of content similarity.
To generate the random sample of reviewers, 100 reviewers were uniformly sampled and
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scores and proportions were then calculated for this sample. It was reasoned that a sample
size of 100 provided a good representation of a set of reviewers identified by some process as
high-quality candidate spammers. To get a reasonable estimate of the average behaviour, the
sampling was repeated 100 times, and the mean proportions were taken across these samples.
Three scores were calculated for each candidate; the maximum content similarity between
any two of their reviews, the proportion of reviews occurring with the same date, and the
proportion of reviews having extreme ratings. The proportion of reviewers having respective
scores greater then a threshold value z was then calculated for each of the two groups. A
proportional test was then applied for each value of z to determine whether or not the
observed di↵erences between the two groups was statistically significant.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the proportion of reviewers that exhibit high content similarity is
significantly increased (p < 0.05) amongst those reviewers identified using the presented ap-
proach. The proportion of reviewers publishing reviews on the same day is also significantly
increased (p < 0.05) amongst these reviewers. Both groups exhibit similar behaviour with
respect to use of extreme ratings, with significant di↵erences only occurring for minimal or
maximal values of z.
In addition to the analysis of aggregated behaviour, a more detailed investigation was
undertaken for 20 candidates deemed to be the most likely spammers. Candidate spammers
were ranked according to the proportion of non-majority reviews (reviewers with a greater
proportion ranked higher) and the top 20 were selected for further investigation. Similar to
the analysis of aggregate behaviour, this investigation considered review text, rating scores,
product categories and the timing of posted reviews. Previous studies have shown that
repeated text, numerous extreme ratings (1-star or 5-star), and posting of multiple reviews
on the same day, particularly within a narrow range of highly similar products, are strong
indicators of spam [84, 131, 132, 2]. Therefore occurrences of these markers were taken as
evidence of opinion spam.
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Rank # reviews # 1? # 5? Similarity Rep. text Rep. dates Comment
1 42 40 2 F F T Sentiment of text
doesn’t match rating
2 37 35 2 T F T
3 27 27 0 T F T
4 42 40 0 T F T Clearly dislikes style of
music, but numerous re-
views
5 27 25 2 T F T Multiple (10) reviews of
same product with dif-
ferent text
6 43 42 1 T T T
7 32 23 2 F F T
8 21 21 0 T F T
9 44 31 6 F F T Username is ’United
Federation of Trolls’,
reviews no longer on
Amazon website
10 34 29 3 T T T
11⇤ 31 16 3 F F F
12 42 16 0 T F F 1? only on recent pop
albums, reviews no
longer on Amazon
website
13 39 29 6 T F F Verified purchase only
on 5? reviews
14⇤ 53 11 2 F F T
15 31 22 9 T F T
16 29 22 6 T T T Numerous 1? reviews
directed at single musi-
cian
17 37 15 5 T T T Multiple reviews of
same product
18⇤ 52 22 12 F T F
19 51 45 5 T T T Strong bias in review
text
20 31 22 7 T F T Strong bias in review
text
Table 4.1: Results of manual investigation of top 20 ranked reviewers. Reviewers were
evaluated based on the number of extreme ratings (1-star or 5-star ratings) awarded, targeting
of highly similarly product groups (e.g. numerous 1? ratings for a particular author), presence
of repeated text in multiple reviews (at least an entire sentence), and posting of multiple
reviews within a short period of time. Reviewers marked with a star showed little or no
corroborating evidence of spam.
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Table 4.1 describes the results of manual investigation for the top 20 candidate spammers.
It was found that of these top 20, at least 17 were highly likely to be opinion spammers, hav-
ing some combination of repeated text, numerous reviews posted on the same day, or large
numbers of extreme reviews focused on particular product groups.
The average running time for the presented approach was 191 seconds (⇠5 million edges,
average over 5 runs, single execution thread on an i5 2.4GHz processor with 8GB RAM). For
comparison, note that FraudEagle is reported to require ⇠100 seconds to perform a single
iteration over a graph containing approximately 1 million edges [2].
4.3 Summary
Opinion spam is a continuing problem for consumers looking to be guided by online product
reviews in making their purchasing decisions. In this chapter, a novel method has been
proposed for detecting opinion spam based only on reviewer ratings. This method takes into
account spammers’ desire to drive mean ratings in a particular direction, and the consequent
di↵erences in spammers’ and honest reviewers’ behaviour. Presented results indicate that
this method is highly e↵ective. The algorithm is able to successfully identify spammers in
a real data set, and shows marginally better performance than FraudEagle using synthetic
data. However, the simplicity of the proposed method means it runs faster than FraudEagle,
and is extremely suitable for use with the large volumes of data typically considered for
opinion spam.
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5. Distributed mining of contrast patterns
This chapter describes a distributed algorithm for mining contrast patterns in large databases.
As described in Chapter 1, contrast pattern mining is a useful tool for identifying significant
di↵erences between two sets. For detection of illicit behaviour, contrast patterns can obvi-
ously be used to compare normal behaviour with known instances of illicit behaviour. Used
in this way, contrast patterns can assist with exploratory analysis, feature selection, and can
also form the basis for supervised or unsupervised learning [37].
The algorithm presented in this chapter allows mining for contrast patterns to be un-
dertaken using a distributed system. This means that mining for contrast patterns may be
undertaken in a scalable manner, and allows application to larger, higher-dimensional data
sets than previously possible. Considering the volume of data and the feature sets used in
previous chapters, the benefits of a scalable approach are abundantly clear.
The proposed algorithm employs a map-reduce-like framework and uses CP-Tree [46] (a
form of prefix tree, described in Section 5.1.2) as the basic underlying data structure. The
advances presented in this chapter are as follows.
1. A method for constructing independent CP-Trees from a distributed database
2. An initial breadth-first processing of a CP-Tree that allows it to be further split into
smaller, independent subtrees
3. Combining (1) and (2), a highly parallel algorithm for mining contrast patterns in a
distributed system
Existing approaches to contrast pattern mining use a depth-first traversal of the search space
(represented using a tree-like structure), as this enables a more e cient use of memory.
However, as described in Section 5.2 an initial breadth-first processing enables a high degree
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of parallelism to be achieved, allowing the proposed algorithm to scale with the number of
computing cores available.
To demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm, a version was been implemented using the
Spark distributed computing platform [195]. In developing the algorithm, Spark was found to
be an extremely accessible platform, providing abstractions and functionality that simplified
the reasoning about distributed algorithms. Moreover, Spark is designed to improve running
times of distributed algorithms by keeping data in memory as much as possible [194, 195].
This provides Spark with a clear advantage over alternative platforms.
Using the Spark implementation, a series of timing experiments were performed using
three di↵erent data sets. In these experiments, the required running time was observed as a
function of the number of records, the number of dimensions, and the number of processors
(cores) available. The proportion of available cores used by the algorithm over the course of
a run was also observed.
5.1 Contrast Pattern Preliminaries
The purpose of contrast pattern mining is to compare two databases D1 and D2, and to
identify patterns that are frequent in one and infrequent in another.
In the following sections a number of definitions are provided that are required to describe
the mining of contrast patterns. The CP-Tree data-structure is then described, as well as the
sequential algorithm used for mining CP-Trees, CP-Growth [46]. The proposed distributed
algorithm makes a number of significant changes to CP-Growth to enable distributed pro-
cessing of large databases. This algorithm is presented in Section 5.2.
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5.1.1 Definitions
Item An item is simply an attribute-value pair i = (attr, value), specifying that some at-
tribute with name attr takes the value value. In some situations, an attribute takes a binary
value, indicating presence or absence of a particular characteristic. In this case, the item
may be given as a single token i = (attr) to indicate that the characteristic is present for a
given object. The single token can be thought of as shorthand for the attribute-value pair
i = (attr, true). Where the particular characteristic is not present, a corresponding item
i = (attr, false) may be specified, or the item may be dropped from the representative set.
Item-Set As the name implies, an item-set is simply a set of items z = {i1, · · · , in}. Given
a global ordering for the set of items in the underlying database, an item-set may be treated
as an ordered-set or a sequence.
Transaction A transaction t is an item-set representing a record in a database. We di↵er-
entiate between a transaction and an item-set because an item-set does not necessarily refer
to a particular record.
Count The count for an item-set z in database D is given as follows. Let Tz = {t 2 D : z ✓
t}, countD(z) = |Tz|.
Support The support for an item-set z is given as suppD(z) = countD(z)/ |D|.
Frequent Pattern Given a minimum threshold ✏, a frequent pattern in a database D is an
item-set z satisfying countD(z) > |D| · ✏. Equivalently, this condition may be expressed in
terms of support, suppD(z) > ✏.
Contrast Pattern Given a minimum threshold ↵ and a maximum threshold  , a con-
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trast pattern from a database D1 to a contrasted database D2 is an item-set z having
countD1(z) > |D1| · ↵ in D1 and countD2(z)  |D2| ·   in D2. Note that if   = 0 the
resulting contrast patterns are also known as jump emerging patterns.
Minimal Pattern For a set of contrast patterns P , a contrast pattern p 2 P is minimal if
@q 2 P s.t. q ⇢ p.
The problem of mining for contrast patterns in a database D = D1 [D2 requires finding
all minimal contrast patterns from D1 to D2 and from D2 to D1.
Mining for contrast patterns is an NP-hard problem, with the size of the search space
growing exponentially with the number of dimensions. The naive approach to contrast pat-
tern mining would generate all possible patterns in D and calculate their respective counts
in D1 and D2. Each pattern would then be evaluated to determine whether or not it is a
minimal contrast pattern. Clearly, this approach will generate an extremely large number of
candidates for any reasonably sized database, and enumeration of these candidates becomes
infeasible.
To mine contrast patterns in a reasonable amount of time, heuristics must be employed
that allow the number of candidates to be reduced. Current state-of-the-art approaches
represent the search-space of candidate patterns using tree-like structures (or more generally,
directed, acyclic graphs). These structures are designed so that traversal along acyclic paths
generates candidates in a specific order, so that a pattern p will be generated before any
of its descendants q   p. By representing the search-space in this way, large portions may
be removed through pruning of branches that satisfy certain conditions. Such branches are
found by first evaluating p, and then determining whether or not the descendants also need
to be evaluated. In particular, if p is not frequent in at least one of D1 or D2, then q cannot
be a contrast pattern, and if p is a minimal contrast pattern then q cannot be a minimal
contrast pattern. In either case, the branch representing all q   p can be pruned from the
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search-space.
While pruning of the search-space can greatly reduce the number of candidate patterns,
evaluating those patterns that remain can still take considerable time. In developing a
distributed algorithm, the aim is to further decrease this running time by partitioning the
search-space into independent units that can be mined in parallel.
5.1.2 CP-Tree
CP-Tree [46] is a form of prefix tree that provides a compact representation of a database
of transactions (recall that the items within each transaction may be ordered, so that each
transaction may be treated as a sequence and two transactions may share a common prefix).
CP-Tree maintains a count at each node giving the number of times that the corresponding
prefix occurs in each of two data sets being contrasted (an example CP-Tree is shown in
Figure 5.1). By representing a database of transactions as a CP-Tree, a minimal number of
candidate patterns are generated as part of the mining process.
Given two data sets D1 and D2, a CP-Tree can be constructed by first merging the two
datasets to form a single database D, retaining a label indicating the source database for each
transaction. From this single database, the full set of items is identified and these items are
sorted in descending order according to the number of times they occur. Each transaction is
then sorted so that the items contained match this ordering. Table 5.1 shows two example
databases, the result of merging these databases and the item counts and the corresponding
sorted transactions.
Having obtained a set of sorted transactions, a CP-Tree is constructed by adding each
transaction one at a time. For each transaction to be added, if the first item matches an
existing node, the count for this node is updated according to the source database for the
current transaction. The next item is then matched to the children of this node and so on
until all items in the transaction have been considered. If no match is found for an item,
then a chain of nodes is added to the tree, corresponding to the unmatched item and all
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Data Transactions
D1 BDFG, DFG, ACD, BDGE
D2 CF , DEFG, ACF , BCEF
D = D1 [D2 (BDFG, 1), (DFG, 1), (ACD, 1), (BDGE, 1), (CF , 2),
(DEFG, 2), (ACF , 2), (BCEF , 2)
Item Counts F = 6, D = 5, C = 4, G = 4, B = 3, E = 3, A = 2
Ordering BDFG ! FDGB, DFG ! FDG, ACD ! DCA, BDGE !
DGBE
CF ! FC, DEFG ! FDGE, ACF ! FCA, BCEF !
FCBE
Table 5.1: Item counts and ordered transactions for two example databases D1, D2.
subsequent items in the transaction. Figure 5.1 shows the resulting CP-Tree for the example
database described in Table 5.1.
5.1.3 CP-Growth
Sequential mining of contrast patterns (CP-Growth) involves a depth-first traversal of the
CP-Tree. At each node, the corresponding counts represent the number of times the prefix
z, extending from the current node back to the root, occurs in the two contrasted data
sets. These counts can be used to determine if this prefix represents a contrast pattern. If
countD1(z) > |D1| · ↵ ^ countD2(z)  |D2| ·   then the corresponding prefix is a contrast
pattern. If z is not a contrast pattern, but countD1(z) > |D1| · ↵ _ countD2(z) > |D2| · ↵
extensions to z may be contrast patterns, so the depth-first search is continued. If neither of
these conditions is satisfied, then the prefix z is not a contrast pattern and no extension of
the prefix pattern can be a contrast pattern. Branches extending this prefix can therefore be
pruned from the tree, and do not need to be visited as part of the traversal. Note that this
pruning is a key part of the CP-Growth algorithm, greatly reducing the required computation.
After the initial construction of the CP-Tree, the counts at each node do not include
instances where the same sequence of items as the corresponding prefix occurs in the database
as a non-prefix subset. For example, in Figure 5.1, the highest level node representing the
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Figure 5.1: Example CP-Tree constructed from a database D = D1 [ D2. Each path
through the tree gives a sequence of items that occur together in transactions from D. The
two numbers under each letter give the number of transactions containing the corresponding
set of items in D1 and D2 respectively.
item D contains only counts for sorted transactions that start with D (i.e. do not contain
item F ). The same holds for all o↵spring of D. However, the item-set FDGB (represented
by the left-most chain) contains DGB as a subset, but not as a prefix. Thus the counts in
the right-most chain (D-G-B-E) must be corrected to reflect this additional occurrence of
DGB.
Correction of counts is achieved through the use of a merge procedure, performed for each
node as the first step when visited in the depth-first traversal. This merge step takes the
children from the target subtree and adds them as siblings, merging with existing siblings as
required. Figure 5.2 shows the e↵ect of merging the subtree extending from F (highlighted),
adding subtrees extending from its children D0 and C 0 as siblings. Since F already has a
sibling D, the child D0 and the sibling D are merged. Since no sibling C exists, the subtree
extending from C 0 is replicated as is. Later, when the depth first traversal reaches node D,
the subsequent merge of D’s children will require merging with this new subtree. Algorithm
5.1 provides high-level pseudo code for CP-Growth. Please see [46] for further details.
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1 Function CP-Growth
input : D1, D2 - databases to be contrasted, ↵,   - threshold parameters
output: P - set of contrast patterns
2 begin
3 D  D1 +D2;
4 N1 = |D1|, N2 = |D2|;
5 P  mine-CP-Tree(T , ;, ;, ↵,  , N1, N2);
6 end
7 Function mine-CP-Tree(T , P ,  , ↵,  , N1, N2)
input : T : CP-Tree, P : found patterns,  : current prefix, (↵,  ): frequency
thresholds, (N1, N2): size of contrasted databases
output: P - set of contrast patterns
8 begin
9 for item i in T do
10 T  merge(T, i);
11  0   [ i;
12 if isContrast(i, ↵,  , N1, N2) then
13 P  P [  0;
14 else if !canPrune(i, ↵, N1, N2) then
15 T 0  subtree(T , i);
16 P  mine-CP-Tree(T 0, P ,  0, ↵,  );
17 end
18 return P
19 end
Algorithm 5.1: Basic outline of CP-Growth algorithm. The functions isContrast and can-
Prune evaluate support for the given item (and corresponding prefix) against the threshold
parameters ↵ and  .
, ,
 1
Figure 5.2: Result of merging the highlighted subtree (corresponding to the item F ). Note
that the highlighted subtree remains unchanged while the rest of the tree is modified.
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5.2 Distributed CP-Growth
Distributed CP-Growth (DCP-Growth) uses a map-reduce like framework to enable dis-
tributed mining of contrast patterns. Rather than build a single large CP-Tree, as is the
case for CP-Growth, DCP-Growth constructs multiple independent CP-Trees. These CP-
Trees are constructed by first building local trees in each process and then merging these
trees in a reduce step. This enables DCP-Growth to operate on a previously distributed
database of transactions. In addition, DCP-Growth performs a breadth-first processing of
the seperate CP-Trees, which enables splitting of the CP-Tree into independent subtrees.
In this way, DCP-Growth partitions the large search-space into independent units that are
mined in parallel.
It is assumed that the database to be mined includes transactions from two contrasted sets
(merged in no particular order), and is distributed across a number of compute nodes. The
full DCP-Growth algorithm is listed in Algorithm 5.2, while Figure 5.3 provides a schematic
overview.
When searching a CP-Tree, the merge-step performed in CP-Growth pulls information
relating to prefix counts from the target subtree into the parent (Figure 5.2). In CP-Growth,
the target subtree is mined immediately after performing this merge (Algorithm 5.1, lines 10
- 16), as dictated by the depth-first traversal. However, note that once merged, mining of
the target subtree can be undertaken independently from the rest of the tree. Subsequent
merge operations performed under a depth-first traversal have no e↵ect outside the target
subtree. In addition, merging a given subtree only a↵ects sibling subtrees that correspond to
an item that is lower in the ordering. For example, in Figure 5.2, having merged the subtree
extending from F , the subsequent merging of D has no impact on the subtree extending
from F , as no chain of descendants extending from D can contain an item F . Consequently,
merge steps for sibling subtrees can be performed in sequence to create a set of subtrees that
can be mined independently. Figure 5.4 shows an example of one such sequence of steps.
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1 Function DCP-Growth
input : D1, D2 - databases to be contrasted; ↵,   - threshold parameters;
Nsplits, H - parameters controlling the splitting of CP-Trees
output: P - set of contrast patterns
2 begin
// Preliminary calculations
3 D  D1 +D2;
4 I  {i : 9t 2 D s.t. i 2 t};
5 Nj2{1,2}  |Dj|;
6 C  {(i, count(i, D) ) : i 2 I};
// Item count used to order items in each transaction
7  D order(I, C);
8 D0  map(D) [t: sort(t,  D)];
// Construct the CP-Trees and split those that are too large to
mine
9 L map-partitions(D0) [Dk: build-local(Dk)];
10 S  reduce-by-key(L);
11 for i 0; i < Nsplits do
12 ⌧  max (map(S)[s : height(s)])  H ;
13 (Ssmall, Slarge) part(S) [s: size(s)  ⌧ ];
14 Ssplit  map(Slarge)[s : split(s, tau)];
15 S  Ssmall [ Ssplit
16 end
// Mine the CP-Trees and find the minimal patterns
17 Q flat-map(S) [(r, s): mine-CP-Tree(s, ;, r,↵,  , N1, N2)];
18 P  {q 2 Q : q 6⇢ p 8p 2 Q \ q};
19 end
20 Function build-local(Dk)
input : Dk - database of transactions in partition k
output: Sk - set of key-value pairs (item i, subtree extending from i)
21 begin
22 Tk  new CP-Tree(Dk);
23 for item i in items(Tk) do
24 Tk  merge(i, Tk)
25 end
26 Sk  {subtree(i, Tk) : i 2 items(Tk)};
27 return Sk;
28 end
Algorithm 5.2: DCP-Growth algorithm. The databases D1 and D2 are assumed to be
partitioned and distributed across multiple compute nodes.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic outline of DCP-
Growth. Control flow moves from top to
bottom. A CP-Tree (Ti) is constructed lo-
cally within each partition. For each of
these trees, a breadth-first processing step
is performed, with the first level of subtrees
being merged into the top node (Mi). Af-
ter merging, each CP-Tree is split into sub-
trees and then reduced to obtain a single
tree for each item in the dataset (Ri, note
K is the total number of unique items). Re-
duced trees are then further split according
to Nsplits and  H to obtain a set of sub-
trees with relatively uniform height. Each of
the resulting subtrees (Ti,j) corresponds to a
prefix present in the database. These sub-
trees are mined independently to discover
contrast patterns beginning with the corre-
sponding prefix (Pi,j). Finally, discovered
patterns are combined and subset of mini-
mal contrast patterns is extracted.
Splitting the CP-Tree into independent subtrees allows mining to be performed in parallel.
However, in a distributed system, splitting alone is unlikely to be of benefit, as a single large
CP-Tree is still required to begin the process. If a large database is distributed across a
number of machines, then construction of a single CP-Tree would require the transfer of all
transactions to the driver program, where the CP-Tree is built and merged, before individual
subtrees are pushed back to the worker nodes.
To avoid building a single large CP-Tree, it is noted that the transformation of a set
of transactions to a CP-Tree is an additive function (i.e. CP -Tree(X) + CP -Tree(Y ) =
CP -Tree(X + Y )). This means that local trees can be built using the transactions held
on each machine, and these trees can be added together to obtain the full representation.
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Figure 5.4: Sequential merging of sibling
subtrees. CP-Tree I is the initial CP-Tree
(shown only to depth 2). Trees II - IV show
CP-Trees corresponding to sequential merg-
ing of subtrees extending from D, C and G
respectively. The final CP-Tree (IV) may
be split into individual subtrees extending
from each item in the top level. The re-
sulting subtrees can be mined for contrast
independently.
Moreover, each local CP-Tree can be merged and split, and the resulting independent subtrees
can be summed with their counterparts from other nodes. In performing these operations,
each local subtree is represented as a key-value pair of the form (item,CP -Tree), where item
gives the root item from which the subtree extends. For example, if the final CP-Tree in
Figure 5.4 represented a local CP-Tree, this would be split into five subtrees, respectively
keyed using F , D, C, G, B, A. Using a reduce-by-key operation, subtrees extending from a
given item are summed to obtain the full tree for each prefix item (Algorithm 5.2, lines 9 -
10).
Depending on the database in question, independent subtrees keyed by a single item may
still be quite large. Since large trees take a significant time to mine, it will often be beneficial
to further split the larger subtrees. This results in a more uniform distribution of heights
across the subtrees, and consequently, a more uniform distribution in the amount of work
required to mine the individual subtrees. In DCP-Growth, further splitting is controlled by
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parameters Nsplits and  H . The parameter Nsplits specifies the number of rounds of splitting
that occur, while the parameter  H specifies the reduction in tree height that occurs in each
round. As described in Algorithm 5.2 (lines 11 - 14), each round of splitting a↵ects trees with
height greater than a threshold ⌧ = max{height(s) : s 2 S}    H , where S is the current
set of subtrees. These trees are recursively split until no tree has height greater than ⌧ .
Splitting of subtrees is performed after the initial reduce. The reason for this is that the
process of merging and splitting subtrees is analogous to actually mining the tree for patterns.
Once merged, the prefix from which a target subtree extends can be evaluated as a contrast
pattern, and most importantly, may be pruned if the necessary criteria are met. This pruning
removes many large subtrees from consideration, saving significant computation. However,
evaluation of prefixes can only take place once the reduced CP-Trees are obtained, as counts
across the full database are required.
Merging and splitting subtrees results in key-value pairs of the form (prefix, CP -Tree),
where prefix represents the sequence of items linking the subtree back to the root in the
original CP-Tree. For example, in Figure 5.2 the subtree extending from F may be further
split into two subtrees extending from C 0 and D0. This would result in two key-value pairs,
(FD, extension-of-D) and (FC, extension-of-C ). Having obtained a set of suitably sized
CP-Trees, these trees may be independently mined using CP-Growth. Any patterns found
are prepended with the prefix stored in the corresponding key. Once all trees have been
mined, results are combined and the subset of minimal patterns is extracted.
5.3 Experiments with real data
To determine the performance of the proposed algorithm a version was implemented us-
ing the Spark cluster-computing platform (http://spark.apache.org). Spark represents
distributed collections of data using an abstraction known as resilient distributed datasets
(RDDs) [194]. The spark API provides a set of functions for managing a distributed envi-
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Data Transactions Items Dimensions Source
P12-01 2,499,394 120 30 AUSTRAC
mushrooms 8,124 72 22 UCI ML Repository
US census 1990 2,458,286 195 58 UCI KDD Archive
Table 5.2: Data sets used in timing experiments.
ronment and for creating, transforming, and querying RDDs within this environment. Using
Spark, the algorithm was implmented as a series of transformations and map-reduce like
operations on these RDDs.
The purpose of the presented experiments is to determine the real-world scalability of
the DCP-Growth algorithm, as implemented in Spark. Ideally, the time required to run
DCP-Growth will be inversely proportional to the number of cores available (i.e. doubling
the number of cores will roughly halve the run time). However, to achieve a high degree of
parallelism, DCP-Growth is required to split large subtrees and redistribute them across the
compute nodes. Once the time taken to perform this redistribution comes to dominate the
running time, addition of more cores will have little impact.
5.3.1 Experiment setup
Using the Spark implementation of DCP-Growth, contrast pattern mining was performed
on 3 real-world data sets. The first data set describes various features of di↵erent species
of mushrooms, and an indicator of whether or not the species is poisonous to humans. The
second data set was provided by AUSTRAC, and consists of a set of parties (individuals
and companies) divided into two distinct classes. The third data set consists of results from
the 1990 US census. Relevant statistics for these data sets are provided in Table 5.2. Note
that the US census data set does not contain a class variable partitioning the data into two
contrasting subsets. For the purposes of these experiments an arbitrary binary variable was
selected (military service) to split the data.
Each of the data sets used in the experiments consists of dense transactions, with each
transaction having a value for each dimension. Evaluations of previous algorithms for mining
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contrast patterns have tended to use sparse data sets, where the total number of attributes
is much greater than the length of the longest transaction, and consequently, the depth of
the resulting CP-Tree. However, it is desirable to test the algorithm using data sets that give
rise to a large search-space, where the degree of parallelism becomes an important factor in
the time taken for the mining to complete.
Experiments were performed using Spark version 1.4.1. Code was compiled using Scala
2.10.5. The Spark environment consisted of 8 compute nodes, running a total of 16 workers.
Four of these nodes have dual Xeon hex core cpus, running at 3.0GHz. The other four nodes
each have a single hex core cpu, running at 4.8GHz. Each of the dual cpu nodes supports
3 workers, with 4 cores each, while each of the single cpu nodes supports a single worker
with 4 cores available. Each worker has 16GB RAM available. For the purposes of our
experiments, Spark was run with a set number of cores requested, but the distribution of
cores was not specified. Thus a run using 8 cores may involve two workers, or may involve
8 workers depending on how resources are allocated to other users. Reported results were
conducted using 8GB per worker. Some comparison was made of running times using 4G,
8GB and 16GB per worker respectively however no significant di↵erences in timing results
was observed.
5.3.1.1 Total running time
The 3 data sets used for evaluation consist of 22, 30 and 58 dimensions respectively. In-
creasing the number of dimensions extends both the width and the height of the resulting
CP-Tree, and is expected to have a significant impact on the time required for mining. To
evaluate the performance of DCP-Growth, each data set was mined for contrast patterns and
the running time recorded. For each combination of parameter values DCP-Growth was run
10 times, and the mean running time was then calculated across the 10 runs.
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5.3.1.2 Frequency parameters
Identification of patterns in DCP-Growth depends on two parameters, ↵ and  . Based on
the values of these parameters, DCP-Growth will prune more or less subtrees as part of the
mining process, which a↵ects the amount of computation performed. To test the magnitude
of this e↵ect, DCP-Growth was run on the US Census data set using 32 cores and di↵ering
values of ↵ and  .
5.3.1.3 Use of available cores
To determine the level of parallelism achieved by the Spark implementation, the run time and
also the proportion of available cores used was measured over a series of runs with di↵ering
values for Nsplits and  H . As described in Section 5.2, Nsplits and  H control the process
by which large CP-Trees are further split into smaller subtrees to obtain a more uniform
distribution of sizes.
In the Spark model of computation, a series of transformations applied to a Spark RDD
are packaged as a single stage. Within each stage, the transformation of each element in
the RDD is represented as a task, and multiple tasks may be run in parallel. If some small
number of these tasks take significantly longer to run than others, the total run-time for the
stage is likely to be dictated by these tasks. Since Spark can’t move to the next stage until
all tasks in the previous stage are complete, many cores will sit idle while this small number
of long-running tasks are completed. In contrast, a larger number of smaller tasks may be
more evenly distributed across the available cores, leading to a greater level of parallelism.
Since the parameters Nsplits and  H influence the number and size of individual subtrees to
be mined, it is expected that di↵erent values for these parameters will significantly influence
the degree of parallelism achieved for a given run.
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5.3.2 Results
Results of timing experiments for the mushroom, P12-01 and census data sets are shown in
Figure 5.5. These results indicate that the DCP-Growth algorithm exhibits good scalability
across a range of parameter values, and is capable of analysing large data sets in a reasonable
amount of time. Note that the running time for the mushroom data set using 1 core and
parameters Nsplits = 0 and  H = 0 represents the time required to run the serial version of
the algorithm. As shown, moving to the distributed version decreases the time required for
analysis.
For the parameters Nsplits and  H, results shown in Figure 5.5 indicate that splitting of
large subtrees is not required for low-dimension data, but is an important optimisation when
a higher number of dimensions is considered. As shown in the top-right plot of Figure 5.5,
setting Nsplits = 0 results in longer run times, particularly when the number of cores available
is high. In this situation, a small number (⌧ Ncores) of large trees account for the majority
of the running time. While these trees are being processed the vast majority of the cores sit
idle, hence the small reduction in running time with additional cores.
Results shown in Figure 5.5 indicate that the number of splits, Nsplits has a greater
impact on run-times than the change in height  H. For the particular setup described in
this chapter, a single round of splitting appears to be preferable when the number of cores
available is  32. However, with 48 cores available, two rounds of splitting performs (roughly)
equally well or better, depending on the value of  H. Moreover, with 48 cores available, the
sensitivity of the algorithm to Nsplits and  H is greatly decreased.
With respect to the frequency parameters ↵ and  , Table 5.3 indicates that variation
in these parameters can result in significant di↵erences in running time (a 85% decrease).
Increasing the value of ↵ means that a given pattern is less likely to be a contrast pattern
and is also less likely to be a subset of a contrast pattern. Consequently, more branches
may be pruned from the CP-Tree and the running time is decreased. For  , increasing the
value means that a given pattern is more likely to be a contrast pattern. Since any patterns
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Figure 5.5: Results of timing experiments on using di↵erent values of Nsplits and  H
(legends show parameter values as Nsplits /  H). From left to right, plots show results for
the mushroom, AUSTRAC P12-01 and Census data sets respectively. The top row of plots
shows the mean running time. Note the changing scale on the vertical axis. The bottom row
of plots shows the reduction in running time relative to a baseline, indicated by the left-most
value on the horizontal axis.
containing a contrast patterns cannot be minimal, this also results in more branches being
pruned from the CP-Tree and a subsequent decrease in running time.
As further evidence of DCP-Growth’s scalability, Figure 5.6 shows the proportion of time
that at least a given proportion of cores are used for di↵ering values of Nsplits and  H.
As expected, these results indicate that more rounds of splitting (higher values of Nsplits),
result in a larger proportion of cores being used for a greater proportion of the running time.
Referring back to Figure 5.5, it is evident that this more e cient use of the available cores
begins to o↵set the additional work required to shu✏e subtrees as the total number of cores
increases.
Compared to the P12-01 and US census data sets, the mushroom data set is quite small.
It is included in our experiments for comparative purposes, as it is a widely known data set
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↵   T ime(mins)
0.6 0.050 27.34
0.8 0.050 18.86
1.0 0.050 3.60
0.8 0.025 17.86
0.8 0.075 14.49
Table 5.3: Results of timing experiments on the US census data, using 32 cores and di↵erent
values of ↵ and  .
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Figure 5.6: Proportion of time that at least a given proportion of cores are used over a
series of runs using 32 cores with ↵ = 0.6 and   = 0.05 (legend shows parameter values as
Nsplits /  H).
and has previously been used for evaluation of sequential mining algorithms. For example,
previous work applying CP-Tree to this data set reported a running time of 2.7 minutes
[177]. As noted above, Figure 5.5 shows that a serial version of the algorithm, implemented
in Scala, can be used to analyse the mushroom data set in less than 24 seconds; a significant
improvement. However, it is noted that the running time reported in [177] involved mining
patterns from each class separately, and was run on hardware available in 2008.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presents a novel algorithm, DCP-Growth, for mining contrast patterns in a
distributed manner. This algorithm combines an initial breadth-first merging of subtrees,
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with the traditional depth-first search used in CP-Growth. Using a recursive procedure,
subtrees are continually merged and split until a certain size is reached, at which point
sequential mining takes place. This design allows a high degree of parallelism, and resulting
scalability, to be achieved. The algorithm has been implemented using the Spark cluster-
computing engine and is available as open-source. Experiments applying this implementation
to real data clearly demonstrate that the presented algorithm is an e↵ective, scalable approach
for mining contrast patterns in large data sets.
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6. Deriving item-based features from networks
for analysis using contrast patterns
This chapter explores the possibility of mapping networks to an item-based feature space,
allowing the application of pattern based data mining and analysis techniques. As discussed
in Chapter 3, some forms of illicit behaviour involve collaboration between multiple entities,
and are best modelled using a network-based approach. However, previous work (including
that described in Chapter 3) on mapping networks to a feature space for data mining have
tended to focus on Euclidean spaces (e.g. [5, 114]).
One of the major advantages of pattern based analysis is the ease in which results may
be interpreted. Pattern based analysis does not require a Euclidean space, thus mapping
networks to an item-space means less restrictions on how information is represented. The
example features developed in this chapter take advantage of this, capturing both structural
and non-structural information. This provides a more flexible, descriptive alternative to the
use of graph invariants.
Two online social networks are considered for the purposes of this chapter. The Slashdot
Zoo, which is a signed network representing slashdot users and their relationships (like /
dislike) and a subset of the Twitter network. Each of these networks is broken into discrete
components, and a set of features is developed that capture both structural and non-structural
information. These features are categorical in nature. Finally, we apply pattern based
clustering to the networks to evaluate the suitability of the developed features.
Results of this clustering demonstrate that the developed features are able to capture
relevant structural and non structural information. The resulting clusters are of a high
quality, and the meaning of each cluster can be easily interpreted.
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6.1 Patten based clustering of networks
Clustering is a fundamental data mining problem, in which attempts are made to identify
meaningful groups of objects present in data. Clustering is frequently used for exploratory
analysis, and is often useful as a preprocessing step for model building, as further analysis
may be better targeted to each distinct class of objects. Similarly, identification of distinct
classes may allow for development and application of more targeted business rules on a class
by class basis. Clustering also plays a major role in many approaches to anomaly detection
and outlier analysis [Chandola2009].
In clustering information-rich networks, the goal is to identify similarities involving mul-
tiple interactions occurring between multiple entities. In choosing to model a system as a
network, it is implied that information held at the entity (or interaction) level is insu -
cient for analysing the particular behaviours of interest [19]. Relevant information is instead
held within the complex relationships between entity states and their patterns of interac-
tion. Clustering a set of networks provides a means to identify groups of networks that share
similarities in these relationships.
6.2 Representation of networks as item-sets
One of the major benefits of using contrast patterns for clustering of networks is their high-
degree of flexibility. Many aspects of a network may be represented as items, allowing a
flexible combination of structural and non-structural information. A number of examples
are presented below, describing how network features can be very easily mapped to items.
Further examples are provided in the application of clustering to real data, described in
sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
Suppose that entities in a network have some attribute attr, then interactions between
entities having particular values for attr can be directly represented as items, attr :val1 !
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attr :val2. Here the attribute is labeled, a specific value is given for the two entities involved,
and the fact that a directed interaction occurred is indicated. Clearly, this idea can be ex-
tended to include edge attributes; for example, an item role:manager – communication:email
! role:CEO. Depending on the particular problem being addressed, this relationship may
be represented using two items, role:manager!role:CEO, communication:email. When us-
ing a single item to represent the relationship, it is clear that similarities between networks
may involve individuals in similar roles communicating in a similar manner. In contrast, use
of two items indicates that similarities may occur between networks based on the form of
communication or the roles of interacting individuals.
In the example given above, specific interactions were represented as a single token, in-
dicating that the interaction occurs at least once in the network. A more detailed view may
consider the frequency of each interaction, so that the corresponding item is represented as
a pair (role:manager ! role:CEO, 5) indicating that the network contains 5 interactions
between a manager and a CEO. Representing the relationship in this way would allow clus-
ters of networks to be identified having similar types of interactions occurring with similar
frequency.
Consider the set of triangles that may occur in a directed graph. There are nine possi-
bilities, which may be treated as items in the pattern-based representation of the network,
for example (triangle-isomorph-3, 5), where the value given is the number of times that the
isomorph appears. Triangles are extremely useful structures for analysing networks (see for
example [103]), and this example shows that they can be easily included in a pattern-based
representation. Of course, any subgraph could be represented as an item in this manner,
so that a pattern-based approach to clustering could involve mining of subgraphs for use of
features. Of course, in considering information-rich networks, features summarising relation-
ships between structure and attributes are more likely to be considered, rather than only
considering the structural information provided by subgraphs.
Suppose now that a particular network has two types of interactions, I1 and I2. Some
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global network measure, diameter for instance, may be of interest, taken across each of these
two interaction types. This can be simply represented as an item (I1-diameter, 3). Here the
name of the feature being represented and the specific value as a pair is given. Note however,
that since a measure such as diameter is expected to vary greatly over di↵erent networks,
the value may be discretised, (I1-diameter, high). This item could then be included in
the representation of a network, along with the corresponding item for the second type of
interaction. In this way, traditional invariants may still be considered and represented in the
item-space.
6.2.1 Clustering of high-frequency patterns
For the allocation of patterns into high-contrast clusters, contrast pattern clustering (CPC)
is applied, as described in [50]. CPC is an iterative clustering algorithm, which first selects
k seed patterns, where k is the user supplied number of clusters. CPC then builds on these
clusters, adding one pattern at a time until no more patterns can be added.
Patterns are added to clusters in two stages. In the first stage, each iteration identi-
fies a candidate set of patterns for each cluster. Candidate patterns for a cluster Ci have
minimal overlap with the patterns already allocated to Ci (i.e. |mat(P ) \ mat(Ci)| 
  ⇤ min(|mat(Pi)|, |mat(Ci)|) for some threshold  ). The best candidate is then selected
based on mutual pattern density, which describes the extent to which two patterns are over-
lapped by other frequent patterns (i.e. the supporting sets for each pattern both have large
intersections with supporting sets for many other patterns). The candidate having the highest
mutual density with those already allocated to the cluster is deemed to be the best candidate,
and this pattern is added to the cluster. This first stage converges when no more candidates
can be found, due to remaining patterns having high overlap with allocated patterns. In
the second stage of CPC these remaining patterns are added to the cluster that having the
greatest overlap. Patterns having equal overlap with multiple clusters are discarded. Once
all patterns have either been allocated or discarded, objects may be mapped to clusters based
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on how well they match the patterns that make up each cluster. Further details of the CPC
algorithm may be found in [50].
6.3 Applications to real data
The following sections present two applications of the described approach, clustering networks
extracted from real data sets. These applications reflect a common use case for clustering
of networks, and serve to illustrate the flexibility and the e↵ectiveness of a pattern-based
approach. For the sake of clarity and brevity, two relatively simple applications have been
selected, considering only a small number of features. However, it should be noted that a
more involved analysis, considering a larger set of features, would follow a similar pattern to
that presented in these applications, although such analysis would obviously be informed by
a deeper level of domain knowledge.
A number of indices and scores for measuring cluster quality exist (e.g. silhouette, mutual
information), however these measures rely on distances for evaluating quality, and are thus
unsuitable for item-based features. An alternative quality index, CPCQ, has been developed,
which uses contrast patterns to score clusters [110]. However the CPC algorithm is specifically
designed to maximise this index [50], thus evaluation with this measure is not particularly fair
or meaningful. Given this limited ability to measure cluster quality, example applications
have been selected that can be evaluated to some degree through manual inspection. In
the first example, attempts are made to identify clusters corresponding to a known domain
concept, and results are checked against a ground truth. In the second example, a small
number of observations are considered using a relatively simple feature set. The resulting
clusters are manually inspected and conclusions drawn based on the patterns describing each
cluster. Despite the simplicity of these examples, both demonstrate the potential of patten
based approaches to network analysis. Moreover, it is clear from these applications that the
methods employed for generating features could be extended to more complex problems.
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6.3.1 Clustering of trust networks
The notion of trust is often represented in social networks using signed edges. Trust networks
are directed networks having a binary edge attribute (+, -) that indicates whether or not the
source individual trusts (or likes) the target individual. The edge-sign prediction problem
involves allocating a binary label (i.e. a sign) to a target edge based on the known signs of
other edges present in the network [12]. Given that the sign of some network edges is assumed
to be known, this problem may also be approached as a supervised learning problem (e.g.
[12, 5]). However, for the purposes this thesis, it will be taken as an unsupervised learning
problem, that attempts to partition the set of target edges into two clusters. It is anticipated
that the chosen features will mean that these two clusters will correspond to positive and
negative signed edges.
Previous work on prediction of trust relationships has shown that the local structure
about each target edge contains su cient information to make accurate predictions [103,
12]. If the neighbourhood around each target edge is considered (i.e. the set of adjacent
edges and related entities), a set of sub-networks is obtained that may be clustered using
a pattern-based approach. The following sections describe the process for selecting target
edges and extracting the corresponding neighbourhoods, and for deriving useful features from
each neighbourhood. Results of clustering are then presented and comparisons made with
alternative solutions to the edge-sign prediction problem.
6.3.1.1 Extraction of sub-networks for clustering
Data was obtained from three online communities, Epinions, Slashdot and Wikipedia de-
scribing the trust relationships between member individuals. Collection of these data has
previously been described [103] and the three data sets are freely available from the Stanford
Network Analysis Project (SNAP, http://snap.stanford.edu). Basic statistics for these three
networks are provided in Table 6.1.
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network num. nodes num. edges
Epinions 131, 828 841, 372
Slashdot 82, 144 549, 202
Wikipedia Elections 7,029 98, 292
Table 6.1: Summary statistics for signed networks
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Figure 6.1: Process for extracting sub-networks from signed network data. (I) A signed
network consisting of eight individuals, expressing trust (+) or distrust (-) relationships.
Note not all edge signs are shown. A target edge with unknown sign is marked by ‘?’. (II)
The sub-network induced by the target edge A!B. (III) Triangles present in the induced
sub-network.
The process used for extracting sub-networks is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In each of the
three data sets 10,000 positive and 10,000 negative edges were selected, and the neighbour-
hood around each edge was then extracted. Target edges were selected as a uniform random
sample. For each target edge, the two individuals connected by the edge were identified
along with any common neighbours (i.e. entities having interactions with both of the enti-
ties connected by the target edge). The sub-network induced by these individuals was then
extracted, resulting in a total of 20,000 sub-networks. Note that these sub-networks are
somewhat equivalent to the notion of an ego-net, but are induced by a target interaction,
rather than a target individual.
Since target edges were selected at random, experiments were repeated 10 times for each
network. Results were then averaged over these ten repetitions.
6.3.1.2 Feature generation
Previous work on prediction of trust relationships has shown that the set of triangles to
which the target edge belongs contains important information for predicting the sign [103].
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As shown in Figure 6.1, each triangle containing the target edge consists of two non-target
edges with known sign. For the purposes of clustering, consideration was given to those
triangles where the two non-target edges form an alternative path between the two vertices
at either end of the target edge (because the network is directed, a triangle may be one of nine
possibilities; here, triangles of the form (A!C, C!B, A!B) are of interest). Considering
this alternative path, each triangle can be unambiguously represented as a pair of signs taken
from the two non-target edges. This gives a total of four possible isomorphs, denoted as +/+,
+/ ,  /+ and  / . Taking each possible isomorph item, each network is represented as
an item-set that indicates the presence of particular isomorphs. For example, the induced
sub-network shown in Figure 6.1, would map to an item-set containing the two items +/ 
and  /+.
In addition to the treatment of triangles as items, the mode sign of the outgoing and
incoming edges for the two individuals linked by the target edge were also considered. For a
target edge A!B, the value of mode(out  edges(A)) and mode(in  edges(B)) were treated
as an item. If there is an equal number of both signs, this is recorded in the item. Combining
this with the items representing triangles, the sub-network shown in Figure 6.1 would be
represented as the item-set {(out,+ :  ), (in,+ :  ), +/ ,  /+}.
6.3.1.3 Clustering results
Having obtained an item-set representation of each sub-network, pattern based clustering
was applied with k = 2, using a minimum support for pattern mining of 3 (i.e. a pattern
supported by at least 3 objects is considered frequent). Results of clustering are shown in
Table 6.2. From these results, it is clear that the two clusters returned for each of the three
data sets considered closely resemble a partitioning of the sub-networks according to the true
sign of the target edges.
The patterns describing each cluster make it quite clear which cluster corresponds to
networks having a positive target edge, and which corresponds to networks having a negative
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network cluster prop. trust prop. distrust
Epinions 1 0.95 0.05
2 0.37 0.63
Slashdot 1 0.66 0.34
2 0.21 0.79
Wikipedia 1 0.92 0.08
2 0.32 0.68
Table 6.2: Clustering results for trust networks. Columns prop. trust and prop. distrust
refer to mean proportions taken over ten samples.
target edge. For example, the pattern +/+ provides a strong indication that its member
cluster corresponds to a positive trust relationship. Consequently, a sign can be allocated to
the networks contained in each cluster based on this interpretation and evaluation made of
how well the clustering algorithm performs against the ground truth. Treating the clustering
as a way to label edge signs, the mean precision over the ten samples was 0.80, 0.76, and 0.79
for the Epinions, Slashdot and Wikipedia networks respectively. For comparison, trained
classifiers applied to the same three data sets in [12] were reported to give precision scores in
the range 0.85 - 0.9, while the classifier described in [103] achieved a precision of just over 0.9
on the Slashdot and Epinions data sets, and just under 0.8 for the Wikipedia data set. Given
that these classifiers are constructed using supervised learning, the unsupervised clustering
approach can be considered to perform extremely well. In addition, note that the structures
considered in [12] could also be included as items, which may improve the performance of
the clustering for this task. However this would necessitate expensive mining process be
performed as part of the feature generation.
6.3.2 Clustering of Twitter ego-nets
For the second application, patten based clustering was applied to a set of ego-nets derived
from political communication on Twitter. The data set used is that described in [33], collected
during the lead up to congressional elections held in the United States of America in 2010.
The full data set consists of ⇠22,000 Twitter members with ⇠78,000 interactions between
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them. Interactions are typed as either a reply or a mention, with both interaction types
being directed. A reply interaction A –reply!B indicates that user A replied to a tweet by
user B. A mention interaction X –mention!Y indicates that user X mentioned user Y in a
tweet. Each interaction has a set of associated hash-tags.
Previous analysis of the political communication network included clustering of individu-
als based on their reply interactions [33]. Note that clustering in this context refers to a purely
structural consideration of the network, with entities being allocated to clusters so that con-
nections within each cluster are stronger than any connections between the clusters (see for
example [159]). Clustering of individuals in this manner was used to split the data into those
individuals having a ‘left’ political-a liation and those having a ‘right’ political-a liation.
For the presented experiment, mention interactions were considered. A pre-constructed
network including only these mention interactions is available from [35] and this version
of the data was used for this work. This network was split into ego-nets, and features
were extracted relating to patterns of interaction between individuals of di↵erent political-
a liations. Clustering was then performed based on these features. The following sections
describes each of these steps in greater detail.
6.3.2.1 Preprocessing and extraction of ego-nets
Labels for political a liation allocated to individuals in the political communication net-
work were determined through analysis of the reply interactions. Consequently, individuals
involved only in mention interactions did not have a label for political-a liation. These
individuals were removed from the network, leaving 3904 individuals, with 9100 interactions.
From this network, ego-nets were then extracted for each individual. Those ego-nets having
a diameter of 1 were discarded, leaving a total of 1108 ego-nets to be clustered.
Each mention interaction present in the Twitter network includes a set of multiple hash-
tags. To assist in the feature extraction described below, each interaction was split into as
many edges as there were associated hash tags, with each edge corresponding to a single
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Figure 6.2: Projection of a network onto a set of attributes. (I) Directed network represent-
ing political communication in Twitter. Individuals (nodes) have a single attribute giving
their political a liation. Interactions (edges) have a single attribute representing a hash-tag.
(II) Projection of network onto (political-a liation, hash-tag). Edge thickness represents the
count for each possible combination in the original network.
hash-tag. This process was applied to all ego-nets extracted from the original network.
6.3.2.2 Aggregated network edges
One way of summarising the information held in a network is to project the network onto a
particular set of attributes and to aggregate any remaining attributes [200]. This is equivalent
to a group by operation performed on tabular data. As shown in Figure 6.2, this operation
results in an aggregate network from which useful features may be extracted.
For clustering of the Twitter ego-nets, aggregate networks were constructed by projecting
each ego-net onto the vertex attribute political-a liation and the edge attribute hash-tag.
This resulted in an aggregate network containing only two nodes, labelled left and right, and
multiple edges representing each combination of hash-tag and political-a liations present in
the original network (see Figure 6.2). The aggregation applied was simply a count oper-
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ation, so that each edge was assigned a new attribute N, giving the number of times the
corresponding combination was observed.
Many of the aggregated networks obtained from the projection contained a large number
of edges, due to the large number of unique hash-tags used in tweets. Therefore, the ten most
frequent edges from each aggregate network were considered. If an aggregate edge network
had less than ten edges to begin with, then all edges were considered.
For each aggregate network, each edge was taken as an item for use in clustering. Items
therefore took the form P : 1 #tag   P : 2, indicating that a user with political-a liation
P : 1 mentioned a user with political-a liation P : 2 in a tweet that included the hash-tag
#tag. Note that the count on aggregate edges was ignored, so that each item represents the
fact that an interaction of this type occurred at least once in the original ego-net.
The process described above is a transform from an ego-net to an item-set by way of an
aggregate network. At each step, structural information is combined with information held
in network attributes.
6.3.2.3 Results of clustering
Clustering was applied using k = 2. The minimum frequency was set so that patterns were
required to appear in at least 100 ego-nets to be considered frequent.
Patterns describing the two clusters that resulted from the presented experiment are
shown in Table 6.3. The majority of these patterns contain only a single item, and this reflects
the high value used for the minimum frequency. Reducing this value would result in longer
patterns (containing more items), describing more specific areas of the space. Summary
information for each cluster is shown in Table 6.4. From the information shown in these two
table, the following points are noted.
1. Cluster 1 is roughly half the size of cluster 2
2. Both clusters have similar proportions of left and right a liations amongst inducing
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individuals
3. Hash-tags #sgp, #ocra and #tlot are seen exclusively in cluster 1, and only occur in
tweets where both individuals have a right a liation
4. Hash-tags #p2, #twisters and #gop are seen exclusively in cluster 2. Both #twisters
and #gop occur only in tweets where both individuals have a right a liation
5. Hash-tags #tcot and #teaparty are seen in both clusters
Based on these observations, it may be suggested that the clustering has simply split
the ego-nets based on their use of a specific set of hash-tags. However, it is interesting to
note that those hash-tags shared by both clusters are split depending on the a liations of the
individuals involved. It is therefore concluded that these shared hash tags are used di↵erently
by ego-nets in cluster 1, compared to those ego-nets in cluster 2. Moreover, Table 6.4 indicates
that the 2 clusters identified account for only 961 ego-nets, with 57 ego-nets not being assigned
to clusters. These 57 ego-nets may be considered somewhat anomalous, having relationships
between hash-tag use and political-a liation not shared by the vast majority. Exactly what
this means in terms of U.S. politics would of course require further analysis, however this
application demonstrates the ability of item based features to di↵erentiate between networks
based on a combination of structural and non-structural information.
6.4 Summary
This chapter has explored the mapping of networks to an item-space for analysis using pat-
tern based approaches. The presented results clearly demonstrate the potential for network
analysis using pattern based approaches, with generated items capturing both structural an
non-structural information.
While the results presented in this chapter are extremely promising, there are a number
of challenges that may be addressed in future work. First, selection of patterns for cluster-
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cluster freq. pattern
1 152 right-#sgp-right
113 left-#teaparty-left
162 right-#tcot-right right-#teaparty-right
120 right-#ocra-right
159 left-#tcot-left
113 right-#tlot-right
2 295 left-#p2-left
522 right-#tcot-right
162 right-#tcot-right left-#tcot-right
297 right-#teaparty-right
308 right-#tcot-left
115 right-#twisters-right
196 right-#p2-right
282 right-#p2-left
146 right-#gop-right
131 left-#teaparty-right
167 right-#teaparty-left
352 left-#tcot-right
243 left-#p2-right
Table 6.3: Allocation of patterns describing political communications in a set of Twitter
ego-nets.
cluster size prop. left prop. right
1 328 0.35 0.65
2 633 0.46 0.54
Table 6.4: Summary of clusters for ego-nets extracted from political communication net-
work. Columns prop. left and prop. right refer to the political a liations of the individual
that induces each ego-net.
ing is currently undertaken using frequency as a measure of interest. However, alternative
measures should be explored, including, for example, consideration of pattern length, and
the density of patterns covering a particular set of networks. Selection of pattens based on
alternative criteria may improve clustering. Second, information-rich networks are often used
to represent dynamic systems, such that the network changes over time. It is suggested that
further study be undertaken in this area to determine how to represent network dynamics in
manner suitable for pattern based clustering. This would allow, for example, networks to be
clustered based on similarities observed in their evolution.
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7. Discussion and conclusions
Research presented in this thesis clearly demonstrates the usefulness of data mining for de-
tection of illicit behaviour. For both of the example problem domains, the presented models
and data mining techniques were e↵ective in detecting the relevant target behaviours. More-
over, the presented solutions are amenable to parallel / distributed computing, providing the
required level of scalability for real-world use. This chapter draws together the major findings
presented in this thesis and outlines the overall contributions to the broader understanding
of how data mining may be applied to the detection of illicit behaviour.
7.1 Summary of research findings
7.1.1 Money laundering
In chapter 3, a novel system was proposed for detecting money laundering in financial net-
works. This system demonstrates an end-to-end analysis pipeline, starting with raw trans-
action reports, constructing a financial network that models di↵erent types of relationships,
extracting meaningful communities from this network, and finally, applying supervised learn-
ing. Evaluation of this system showed that it is capable of producing high-quality classifiers,
able to di↵erentiate between suspicious and non-suspicious communities with high precision.
The presented system, along with recent projects reported in the literature (e.g. Drez˙ewski,
Sepielak, and Filipkowski [41], Bershtein and Tselykh [15], and Michalak and Korczak [123]),
represent significant advancement over previous approaches focusing on individual parties.
Each of these projects clearly demonstrate the potential of network analysis for detection of
money laundering and financial crime. As described in Section 7.1.1.1, it is expected that
future work will continue to improve network-based systems, applying more sophisticated
network modelling and improving the feature set used for supervised learning.
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7.1.1.1 Future work
The system described in this thesis provides a basic framework for identifying money laun-
dering activity in a transaction network. However, it is intended that future work will extend
and improve this basic framework, informed by feedback provided from its use in an actual
financial intelligence environment.
One limitation of the described approach is that network structure is represented solely
through graph invariants. Moreover, the particular invariants used can only describe the
global structure of each community. It may be that more localised descriptors, such as the
role assignment proposed in [41], provide a more informative view. It is expected that future
work will employ the types of approaches described in Chapter 6 for capturing relationships
between the structure and particular edge and vertex attributes.
In addition, since supervised learning is employed in the current system, there is little
scope for discovery of new typologies. To address this issue, future work will also consider
unsupervised approaches. In particular, this will include the use of network-based anomaly
detection, using approaches described in Appendix A (published as [158], see also Akoglu,
Tong, and Koutra [1]).
7.1.2 Opinion spam
In chapter 4, a novel method was described for identifying opinion spammers based on their
rating behaviour. This method was developed through consideration of spammers’ goal,
namely their desire to drive mean ratings in a particular direction. The proposed method
analyses rating behaviour and identifies those reviewers whose behaviour over multiple re-
views is suggestive of a deliberate attempt to manipulate average ratings. Application of the
proposed method to the Amazon data set indicates that the proposed method is successful
in identifying real-life opinion spammers.
As described in Chapter 2 a number of di↵erent approaches have now been suggested
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for identifying opinion spam. The method proposed in this thesis is one of the more simple
methods, considering only rating behaviour and applying a simple statistical test to identify
significant deviation from normal behaviour.
This approach could easily be combined with other descriptors of spammer behaviour (e.g.
timing of reviews [191, 47], or, if available, text-based features) as part of a more complex
classifier, such as those proposed in Mukherjee, Liu, and Glance [131] and Mukherjee et al.
[132].
In undertaking the manual investigation of candidate spammers, an interesting phe-
nomenon was noted, that has not previously been discussed in the relevant research lit-
erature. Many of the reviews published by the top 20 spammers were highly derogatory and
were clearly aimed at a particular subset within particular product ranges. For example, one
reviewer had singled out 3 specific female pop artists, all having a similar style of music, and
had written highly negative reviews for multiple albums by each of these artists. From the
review text it is clear that this reviewer has an aversion to this particular style of music, and
it seems highly unlikely that this reviewer had genuinely purchased each of the target albums
expecting to enjoy them. Another reviewer displayed a strong political bias in their rating of
books, while another claimed that a particular video game was the greatest game ever made
and posted numerous 1 star reviews of other games in the same genre. This type of reviewer
is quite interesting, as the review text in no way attempts to disguise the reviewers bias and
pose themselves as an objective reviewer. This type of behaviour has been termed agenda
spam, whereby a particular reviewer appears to have a specific political or personal agenda
and uses product reviews as a kind of public (yet anonymous) forum in which to express
their views. Note that while these types of review may not be intended to derive financial
benefit, it can be argued that they still represent a form of spam, as they pollute the review
space with non-objective, highly-biased and largely unhelpful reviews.
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7.1.2.1 Future work
While the approach presented in this thesis is able to identify opinion spammers, there are a
number of improvements that should be considered in future work.
1. The presented approach considers a global probability that a random review will di↵er
from the mean rating. This probability is estimated from available reviews. This means
that the estimate includes the contribution from spammer reviews. This probability
could instead be treated as a hyper-parameter, being updated after running the iterative
correction of the mean ratings. This is likely to improve the accuracy of the achieved
when applying the binomial test.
2. In the current model, the mean rating is used as a measure of majority opinion. Future
work could consider alternative models of majority opinion, and more detailed descrip-
tions of the distribution of rating scores over each product. Improvements in this area
may include analysis of reviewer bias (i.e. a reviewers tendency to give high or low
ratings; some reviewers never give a product 5 stars, while others frequently give 5 star
ratings).
3. The presented approach should be combined with alternative approaches to gain a
more comprehensive detection system. Spammers employ a wide range of strategies,
and particular strategies may be more easily detected using a particular approach.
Combining these di↵erent approaches in a flexible manner would provide an e↵ective
method for dealing with the multi-faceted nature of spammer behaviour.
In addition to the improvements outlined above, future work should also consider how
the type of approach presented in this thesis can be extended to detect groups of spammers
acting in a coordinated manner. Previous work has shown that detection of spammer groups
is possible by considering groups of reviewers having multiple products in common [132]. Co-
ordinated behaviour amongst reviewers is likely to be be relatively unusual, so that spammer
groups may be identified based on their deviation from normal, uncoordinated behaviour.
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7.1.3 Pattern based analysis
In chapter 5 a novel algorithm was presented for mining contrast patterns in a distributed
manner. This is an important step forward for contrast pattern mining, making this type
of analysis a viable approach for detection of illicit behaviour in the large data sets that are
characteristic of relevant problem domains.
In particular, experiments using the described algorithm showed that contrast pattern
analysis could be successfully applied to the AUSTRAC data set, identifying significant
di↵erences between suspicious and non-suspicious behaviour in relation to money laundering.
With respect to network analysis, experiments presented in Chapter 6 suggest that con-
trast patterns may represent a useful tool for network analysis. These experiments show that
information-rich networks can be mapped to a sparse item-space that captures the relation-
ships between structural information and edge and vertex attributes.
7.1.3.1 Future work
As shown in the presented experiments, the DCP-Growth algorithm provides good scala-
bility and is able to achieve reasonable run times with large numbers of transactions and
high dimensionality. However, DCP-Growth should be seen as a good starting point only,
and further advances should now be considered. For example, following from Terlecki and
Walczak [177], it is expected that modification of DCP-Growth to consider only the top-k
contrast patterns would significantly improve running times, since this allows more aggressive
pruning of the underlying CP-Trees. In a similar vein, consideration of pattern length when
determining the required support [193] would also lead to improved run-times. Another pos-
sibility for improvement would be to consider alternative data-structures for contrast pattern
mining (e.g. ZBBDs [111]) and consider how these may be adapted to a distributed system.
Future work should also consider further applications of contrast patterns to network
analysis. Of particular interest, is the relationship between pattern-based analysis and the
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use of frequent subgraphs to represent networks (e.g. [12, 44]). While the work presented in
this thesis has considered relatively simple item-spaces, more complex analysis may include
consideration of contrast subgraphs that clearly describe significant the structural di↵erences
between sets of networks.
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A. Anomaly detection in online social networks
A.1 Introduction
Anomalies arise in online social networks as a consequence of particular individuals, or groups
of individuals, making sudden changes in their patterns of interaction or interacting in a man-
ner that markedly di↵ers from their peers. The impacts of this anomalous behaviour can be
observed in the resulting network structure. For example, fraudulent individuals in an online
auction system may collaborate to boost their reputation. Because these individuals have a
heightened level of interaction, they tend to form highly interconnected subregions within the
network [142]. In order to detect this type of behaviour, the structure of a network can be
examined and compared to an assumed or derived model of normal, non-collaborative inter-
action. Regions of the network whose structure di↵ers from that expected under the normal
model can then be classified as anomalies (also known as outliers, exceptions, abnormalities,
etc.).
In recent times, the rise of online social networks and the digitisation of many forms
of communication has meant that online social networks have become an important part
of social network analysis (SNA). This includes research into the detection of anomalies in
social networks, and numerous methods have now been developed. This development has
occurred over a wide range of problem domains, with anomaly detection being applied to
the detection of important and influential network participants (e.g. Shetty and Adibi [168],
Malm and Bichler [115], and Cheng and Dickinson [31]), clandestine organisational structures
(e.g. Shetty and Adibi [168], Krebs [96], and Reid et al. [153]), and fraudulent and predatory
activity (e.g. Phua et al. [147], Fire, Katz, and Elovici [49], Chau, Pandit, and Faloutsos
[28], Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos [2], and Pandit et al. [142]).
Since anomaly detection is coming to play an increasingly important role in SNA, the
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purpose of this chapter is to survey existing techniques, and to outline the types of challenges
that can be addressed. To our knowledge this chapter represents the first attempt to examine
anomaly detection with a specific focus on social networks. The contributions of this chapter
are as follows
• provide an overview of existing challenges in a range of problem domains associated
with online social networks that can be addressed using anomaly detection
• provide an overview of existing techniques for anomaly detection, and the manner in
which these have been applied to social network analysis
• explore future challenges for online social networks, and the role that anomaly detection
can play
• outline key areas where future research can improve the use of anomaly detection
techniques in SNA
In drafting this review we did not set out to consider particular problem domains. Rather,
we aimed to identify tools specifically designed for detection of anomalies, regardless of the
particular social networks they were designed to analyse. However, as we conducted our
survey we found that relevant work was predominantly published in the area of computer
science, and consequently, many of the applications of anomaly detection that we encountered
were focused on anomalies in online systems. Therefore, unless specifically stated otherwise,
the term social network will be used throughout this chapter to mean an online social network.
Within the social sciences literature, we found a number of papers focusing on the concept
of network change (see for example McCulloh and Carley [120], Arney and Arney [9], and
Tambayong [176]), which attempts to characterise the evolution of social networks. We see
anomaly detection as being a subset of change detection, as anomaly detection could be used
to identify change points where an evolving social network undergoes a rapid change, however
a network that evolves in a consistent fashion over an extended period of time is unlikely to
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be deemed anomalous. We have therefore elected to limit the scope of our review to those
methods that deal specifically with anomaly detection.
A.2 Related Work
Previous reviews of anomaly detection have provided an overview of the general, non-network
based problem, describing the use of various algorithms and the particular types of problems
to which these algorithms are most suited [74, 26, 117, 118]. A workshop on the detection of
network based anomalies was also held at ACM 2013 [3]. The most recent review of general
anomaly detection [26], expands on previous works to define six categories of anomaly detec-
tion techniques; classification (supervised learning), clustering, nearest neighbour, statistical,
information theoretic, and spectral analysis.
As well as categorising anomaly detection techniques, previous reviews describe a number
of challenges for anomaly detection, mainly associated with the problem of defining normal
behaviour, particularly in the face of evolving systems, or systems where anomalies result
from malicious activities [26, 74]. In particular, Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar [26] note
that the development of general solutions to anomaly detection remains a significant chal-
lenge and that novel methods are often developed to solve specific problems, accommodating
the specific requirements of these problems and the specific representation of the underlying
systems. As discussed in Section A.7, this has also been the case for some methods focused
on anomaly detection in social networks.
In addition to the major reviews of anomaly detection described above, other works
have considered anomaly detection as part of methodological surveys for particular problem
domains. For example, methods for performing anomaly detection have been discussed as
part of more general reviews in areas of fraud detection [18, 147], network intrusion [87, 63,
146], and the deployment of wireless sensor networks [199, 79]. While significant overlap exists
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between the analysis of computer and sensor networks and social networks, there are also
a number of di↵erences that must be taken into account. In particular, social networks are
typically composed of many inter-connected communities, which has important consequences
for the distribution of node degree, and the transitivity of the network [138]. Moreover,
anomaly detection in both sensor and computer networks is typically required to occur online
in (soft) real-time, and while this constraint may also apply in some SNA scenarios, it is not
typically required. In addition, anomaly detection in sensor networks generally requires
algorithms that reduce network tra c and have a low computational complexity [199].
A.3 Problem domains for the application of anomaly de-
tection in social networks
Anomalies in social networks are often representative of illegal and unwanted behaviour. The
recent explosion of social media and online social systems, means that many social networks
have become key targets for malicious individuals attempting to illegally profit from, or
otherwise cause harm to, the users of these systems.
Many users of online social systems such as Facebook, Google+, Twitter, etc. are regularly
subjected to a barrage of spam and otherwise o↵ensive material [169, 49, 5, 68]. Moreover,
the relative anonymity and the unsupervised nature of interaction in many online systems
provides a means for sexual predators to engage with young, vulnerable individuals [49].
Since the perpetrators of these behaviours often display patterns of interaction that are
quite di↵erent from regular users, they can be identified through the application of anomaly
detection techniques. For example, sexual predators often interact with a set of individuals
who are otherwise unconnected, leading to the formation of star like structures [49]. These
types of structures can be identified by examining a range of network features [5, 169, 68],
or through the use of trained classifiers [49].
Online retailers and online auctions have also become a key target for malicious individ-
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uals. By subverting the reputation systems of online auction systems, fraudsters are able to
masquerade as honest users, fooling buyers into paying for expensive goods that are never
delivered. This process is facilitated by the use of Sybil attacks (the use of multiple fake
accounts) and through collaboration between fraudulent individuals to artificially boost rep-
utation to a point where honest buyers are willing to participate in large transactions [28,
142]. In many online stores, opinion spam, in the form of fake product reviews, is used in
an attempt to distort consumers’ perceptions of product quality and to influence buyer be-
haviour [2]. Again, the malicious individuals who engage in these types of behaviour often
form anomalous structures within the network, as their patterns of interaction can be quite
di↵erent from regular users.
In addition to the social networks supported by dedicated online systems, mining of the
social networks induced by mobile phone communications, financial transactions, etc. can
also be used to identify illegal activities. Detection of anomalies in these types of networks
have previously been used to identify organised criminal behaviour, including insurance fraud
[173], and terrorist activities [153, 96]. Given the highly detrimental impact of these types
of behaviour, anomaly detection in social networks can be seen as an extremely important
component in the growing tool-box for performing social network analysis (SNA).
Outside of criminal or malicious behaviour, anomaly detection has also been used to
detect important and influential individuals [168], individuals fulfilling particular roles within
a community [189], levels of community participation [16], and unusual patterns in email
tra c [44].
A.4 Definitions
Anomalies are typically defined in terms of deviation from some expected behaviour. A recent
review of general, non-network based anomaly detection defined anomalies as ‘patterns in
data that do not conform to a well defined notion of normal behaviour’ [26]. Another recent
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review defines anomalies as ‘an observation (or subset of observations) which appears to
be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data’ ([14], cited in [74]). We note two
important aspects of these definitions.
First, the definitions given above highlight the importance of defining expected behaviour,
but are somewhat imprecise in terms of exactly how the anomaly deviates from this expecta-
tion. This imprecision stems from the fact that the magnitude of any deviation will depend
on the specific problem domain [26].
Second, these definitions presuppose an understanding of what exactly should be ob-
served in order to di↵erentiate normal and anomalous behaviour. In order to detect real-life
behaviour of interest we must observe the underlying system through a suitable set of fea-
tures, and determining which features will provide the greatest separation of normal and
anomalous behaviour is in itself a key challenge in anomaly detection [26]. This can be es-
pecially di cult in adversarial problem domains as the behaviour of anomalous entities may
change over time in direct response to the detection methods employed.
For the detection of anomalies in social networks, we are concerned with the pattern
of interactions between the individuals in the network. Thus, following [26, 74] we define
network anomalies simply as patterns of interaction that significantly di↵er from the norm.
As is the case for general anomaly detection, this definition is highly imprecise, and for a
given domain, the specific meaning of ‘pattern of interaction’ and ‘significantly di↵er’ will
reflect the particular behaviour of interest. For example, one analysis of emails between
employees of the Enron corporation considered ‘patterns of interaction’ to simply be the
number of emails sent by an individual over a given period of time [149]. For this particular
study, this metric was deemed to be a suitable feature for identifying the real-life anomalous
behaviour of interest. However, for a di↵erent study, concerned with a di↵erent aspect of
employee behaviour, a di↵erent metric may be considered in order to capture the appropriate
‘patterns of interaction’.
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In this chapter, we focus on the detection of anomalies resulting from patterns of in-
teraction that di↵er from normal behaviour within the same social network. However, for
completeness, we note here that another form of anomaly exists, termed horizontal anoma-
lies [54]. Horizontal anomalies occur when the characteristics or behaviours of an entity vary
depending on the source of the data [54, 143]. For example, a user of social media may have
a similar set of friends or followers across a number of platforms (e.g. Twitter, Facebook,
etc.), but for one particular platform (Google+ for example) has a markedly di↵erent set
of acquaintances. Methods for detecting this type of anomaly are beyond the scope of this
chapter. However, given the highly diverse nature of the systems from which social network
data is currently being extracted, we believe that the detection of horizontal anomalies will
become extremely important in the near future, and suggest that further research in this
area will be extremely fruitful.
A.5 Characterisation of anomalies
In analysing social networks it is the interactions between individuals that form the main ob-
ject of study. Focus is given to the manner in which interactions between pairs of individuals
influence interactions with and between other individuals in the system, and the relationship
between these interactions and the attributes of the individuals involved (see Brandes et al.
[19] and Getoor and Diehl [61] for discussion of network analysis in general). This di↵er-
entiates anomaly detection in social networks from traditional, non-network based analysis,
where individual’s attributes are assumed to follow some population level distribution that
ignores interactions and the resulting relationships between individuals and their peers.
Typically, social networks are represented using a graph with vertices (nodes) represent-
ing individuals (or groups, companies, etc.) and edges (links, arcs, etc.) between the vertices
representing interactions. In some instances, nodes may be partitioned into multiple types,
and such networks can be represented using bipartite (or tripartite, etc.) graphs.
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Depending on the type of analysis being performed, networks can be characterised as being
either static or dynamic, and as being labelled or unlabelled. Obviously, dynamic networks
change over time, with changes occurring in the pattern of interactions (who interacts with
who), or in the nature of these interactions (how X interacts with Y). Labelled networks
include information regarding various attributes of both the individuals and their interactions.
It could be argued that all social networks are dynamic, however it is often useful to
analyse social networks as if they were static. As an example, consider the Enron email
data set (analysed in Priebe et al. [149], Akoglu, McGlohon, and Faloutsos [5], Eberle and
Holder [44], and Eberle and Holder [43]), which consists of a dynamic network, representing
the emails sent between Enron employees between 1998 - 2002. This network changes over
time as di↵erent groups of individuals send and receive emails at di↵erent times. If employee
A sends five emails to employee B, a dynamic representation of the network would track
these five emails as links between A and B occurring only in the appropriate time-steps. If
the properties of each email are considered (e.g. length, subject, etc.) then the network is
treated as being labelled. By considering a dynamic representation of the network, Priebe
et al. [149] were able to detect anomalous time-steps where a particular individual suddenly
increased the number of emails they sent relative to previous time-steps.
In contrast to a dynamic representation of the Enron network, if consideration is given
to the total set of emails sent by each employee over the full time period, the time at which
each email is sent is no longer deemed important and the network can be treated as static.
In reducing the network from a dynamic to a static representation, multiple interactions
occurring at di↵erent points in time may be combined in some way, and represented by a
single link. This link may be labelled with the number of interactions it represents, and with
some aggregation of the properties of these interactions (e.g. mean email length), or it may
be that only the fact that an interaction took place is important, and the network can be
treated as being unlabelled. For example, a static, unlabelled representation of the Enron
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email network was used in the analysis by [5], where the formation of an anomalous star like
structure was identified, indicative of a single individual (Ken Lay, a former CEO) sending
emails to large numbers of individuals who were not otherwise connected (i.e. they did not
send emails to one another). Thus, so long as the information is actually available, a network
can be easily represented in a number of di↵erent ways, depending on the requirements of
the analysis.
Exactly how a social network is chosen to be represented will depend of course on the
type of anomalies to be detected. As with the networks themselves, the anomalies that occur
in social networks can also be characterised as being dynamic or static, and as labelled or
unlabelled. A dynamic anomaly occurs with respect to previous network behaviour, while
a static anomaly occurs with respect to the remainder of the network. Labelled anomalies
relate to both network structure and vertex or edge attributes, while unlabelled anomalies
relate only to network structure (see Akoglu and Faloutsos [3]).
In addition to the characterisation as dynamic or static and labelled or unlabelled, anoma-
lies can be further characterised as occurring with respect to a global or local context and as
occurring across a particular network unit, which we refer to as the minimal anomalous unit.
A global or local context simply describes whether an anomaly occurs relative to the entire
network, or relative only to its close neighbours. For example, an individual’s income may
be globally insignificant (many people have similar income), however if the income of their
friends (defined by their links within the network) are all significantly higher, they may be
considered a local anomaly [55, 81]. The minimal anomalous unit refers to the network struc-
ture that we consider to be anomalous. If we are interested in changes made by individuals,
a sudden change in the medium of communication for example, we might consider a single
vertex to be the minimal anomalous unit. However, if we are interested in larger groups of
individuals, perhaps a group of fraudulent individuals collaborating to boost their reputation
in an online auction system [142], the minimal anomalous unit of interest scales to that of a
sub-network. In this situation, the behaviour of any given vertex may not be anomalous, but
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taken together as a group, the pattern of communication may be anomalous with respect to
other groups of vertices in the network. Throughout this review, we will consider how the
di↵erent approaches to anomaly detection relate to each of these four characteristics.
A.6 Methods for anomaly detection
In Section A.5, we defined four characteristics that can be used to categorise anomalies; static
or dynamic, labelled or unlabelled, local or global context, and the minimal anomalous unit.
In this section we outline various approaches for detecting these di↵erent types of anomalies.
In practice we found that characterisation as static or dynamic and labelled or unlabelled
best di↵erentiates the various approaches, thus the following section is organised according
to characterisation along these two axes.
Note that we have considered here only methods that have previously been used to anal-
yse social networks. Network based anomaly detection has been investigated in a number of
additional problem domains including intrusion detection [59, 63, 87], tra c modelling [167]
and gene regulation [92, 91]. However since we are primarily interested in social networks we
have not included these studies in our review.
A.6.1 Static unlabelled anomalies
Static, unlabelled anomalies occur when the behaviour of an individual or group of individuals
leads to the formation of unusual network structures. Because the labels on edges and vertices
are not considered, any information regarding the type of interaction, it’s duration, the age
of the individuals involved, etc. is ignored. Only the fact that the interaction occurred
is significant. Thus in order to detect anomalous behaviour, assumptions must be made
regarding the probability that a given pair of individuals will interact.
As an example, Shrivastava, Majumder, and Rastogi [169] noted that email spam and
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viral marketing material is typically sent from a single malicious individual to many targets.
Since the targets are selected at random, they are unlikely to be connected independently of
the malicious individual, and the resulting network structure will form a star. Based on this
observation, the number of triangles in each ego-net 1 is used to label the subject individual
as being either malicious or innocent, with a low triangle count indicating a malicious indi-
vidual. Extensions to this basic approach have also been used to detect groups of malicious
individuals acting in collaboration [169].
While Shrivastava, Majumder, and Rastogi [169] considered star-like structures to be
indicative of malicious behaviour, Akoglu, McGlohon, and Faloutsos [5] demonstrated that
both near-stars and near-cliques may be indicative of anomalous behaviour in social networks.
Cliques and stars form the extremal values of a power-law relationship between the number of
nodes in an ego-net and the number of edges (Ne / N↵v ), thus in order to detect anomalies,
a power-law curve can be fitted to the network, and the residuals analysed for significant
deviance from the expected relationship. This idea has been applied to numerous properties
of the ego-net [5, 68], and in a comparison of various combinations of features, Hassanzadeh,
Nayak, and Stebila [68] showed that a power-law relationship between edge count, and the
average betweenness centrality (see Hassanzadeh, Nayak, and Stebila [68] for definitions) of
an individual’s ego-net was most useful in di↵erentiating between normal and anomalous
(near-cliques or near-stars) ego-nets.
Another approach for detecting static, unlabelled anomalies is the use of signal processing
techniques. The application of signal processing stems from work on graph partitioning, and
community detection [127, 137], and treats anomalous subgraphs as a signal embedded in a
larger graph, considered to be background noise. The problem of detecting this anomalous
subgraph is formulated in terms of a hypothesis test [127, 128, 125] with
H0: the graph is noise (no anomalous subgraph exists)
H1: the graph is signal + noise (an anomalous subgraph is embedded in the graph)
1An ego-net is defined as the subgraph induced by consideration of a subject and their immediate neigh-
bours
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The null hypothesis assumes that the network is generated by some stochastic process de-
scribing the probability that any pair of nodes will be connected by an edge. Anomalous
subgraphs are generated by di↵erent underlying processes, resulting in a density of edges that
di↵ers from that expected under the null model [127]. Clearly, the degree to which a sig-
nal processing approach can be successfully applied depends on the identification of suitable
null models describing the background graph. The most basic model of random graphs, the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, treats the possibility of an edge between two vertices as an independent
Bernoulli trial, so that any given edge exists with probability p. However, graphs generated
using this process exhibit a Poisson distribution of vertex degrees, which has been shown to
be a poor approximation of many real world networks. Typically, real social networks exhibit
a much fatter tail than the Poisson distribution [136, 122]. More sophisticated models, such
as the recursive-matrix model (R-MAT) are able to generate more realistic graphs with some
degree of clustering and non-Poisson degree distributions [23, 136, 122]. However, the selec-
tion of a suitable model remains a challenge for signal processing approaches, and further
research is required in this area.
A.6.2 Static labelled anomalies
By considering vertex and edge labels in addition to the network structure, a context can be
defined in which typical structures may be considered anomalous. Conversely, the particular
combination of edge and vertex labels within the context defined by a given network structure
(say an ego-net or community) may also be considered anomalous.
In addition to the detection of cliques and stars using unlabelled properties, Akoglu,
McGlohon, and Faloutsos [5] also considered edge labels to detect ‘heavy’ ego-nets, where
the sum over a particular label is disproportionately high relative to the number of edges.
For example, in analysing donations to US presidential candidates, the Democratic National
Committee were found to have donated a substantial amount of money, but this money was
spread over only a few candidates, thus the ego-net formed is considered ‘heavy’. In contrast
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the Kerry Committee received a large number of donations, but each donation was for a small
amount. In this example, a bipartite network is considered (with candidates and donors as
the two vertex types), and the ego-net provides a context in which the received or donated
amounts may be considered anomalous. Outside this structure, a series of small or large
donations may be perfectly normal.
Taking a similar view of context, the detection of community dependent anomalies has
been investigated by dividing the network into communities based on individuals’ patterns
of interactions, and then considering the attributes of the members of each community [55,
81, 64, 133]. Attribute values which would be deemed normal across the entire network may
appear as anomalies within the more restricted context imposed by the community setting.
For example, Gao et al. [55] describe a situation where the patterns of interaction between a
particular group of individuals marks them as a community within a larger network, however
one member of this community has a far lower income than their peers. Globally, this indi-
vidual’s income is completely normal, however within the context provided by the community
their income is seen as an anomaly.
In the realm of spam detection, static labelled anomalies have been used to identify
opinion spam in online product reviews [2, 28, 142]. These researchers have applied belief
propagation to anomaly detection, whereby ‘hidden’ labels assigned to vertices and edges are
updated in an iterative manner conditionally based on the labels observed in the system of
interest.
As an example of belief propagation, the FraudEagle algorithm [2] uses a bipartite graph
to represent reviews of products in an online retail store, with users forming one set of vertices,
and products forming the other. Edges between users and products represent product reviews
and are signed according to the overall rating given in the review. The aim of FraudEagle is
to assign a hidden label to each node, with users labelled as either honest or fraudulent, and
products as good or bad. These labels are assigned based on the observed pattern of reviews.
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It is assumed that normal, honest reviewers will typically give good products positive reviews
and bad products negative reviews, while fraudulent reviewers are assumed to regularly do
the opposite. This assumption is encoded as a matrix describing the probability of a user
with a hidden label of either honest or fraudulent giving a positive or negative review of a
product whose hidden label designates it as either good or bad. By iteratively propagating
labels through the network according to these assumed probabilities (i.e. by applying loopy
belief propagation), the system is able to determine those users who can be considered as
opinion spammers.
While not strictly applied to social networks, TrustRank [65] could also be considered as
an example of a belief propagation approach to anomaly detection. In TrustRank, trustwor-
thy pages are assumed to be unlikely to link to spam pages, and given an initially labelled set
of trustworthy pages, trust is propagated through page out-links, so that those pages within
k-steps of the the initially trusted page are also labelled as trustworthy. By ranking pages
according to the propagated trust score, spam pages, representing anomalies, can be detected.
Another approach to the detection of static labelled anomalies is the application of infor-
mation theory, which provides a set of measures for quantifying the amount of information
described by some event or observation. The most commonly used measure, entropy, de-
scribes the number of bits required to encode the information associated with a given event.
Thus, given a set of observations O, the global entropy H(O) can be thought of as a measure
of the degree of randomness or heterogeneity. A set containing a large number of di↵erent
observations will require more bits to store the associated information and will therefore have
a higher global entropy. In contrast a totally homogeneous set will require relatively few bits
to store the associated information.
In terms of anomaly detection, entropy can be used to identify those subgraphs that if
removed from the network would lead to a significant change in entropy. These subgraphs
may represent important communities or individuals [168, 178, 166], or may represent a
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normal pattern of behaviour that can then be used as a point of comparison, with those
subgraphs that deviate from this norm considered to be anomalous [140, 44, 43]. In comparing
subgraphs, an information theoretic approach considers a global context, using a very di↵erent
representation of the network than that used in the other approaches described in this chapter.
In applying an information theoretic approach, interactions are represented as subgraphs,
and values typically represented as labels on edges or vertices are themselves represented as
a vertex in this subgraph.
Information theoretic approaches have been shown to be capable of detecting anomalous
interactions based on complex structures and flows of information. For example, a version
of this method was applied to the Enron email data set [43], resulting in detection of a
single instance of an email being sent from a director to a non-management employee, and
then being forwarded to another non-management employee. Within the Enron data set
many emails are sent from directors to non-management employees and between pairs of
non-management employees, but this was the only instance involving a forwarded email from
a director to a non-management employee. This degree of sensitivity is useful in problem
domains consisting of adversarial systems where individuals actively seek to hide illegal or
otherwise unwanted behaviour, and deviations from the norm are likely to be small [43].
A.6.3 Dynamic unlabelled anomalies
Dynamic unlabelled anomalies arise when patterns of interaction change over time, such that
the structure of a network in one time-step di↵ers markedly from that in previous time-steps.
As with static unlabelled anomalies, there are obviously numerous graph properties that we
may consider, each of which can be used to generate time-series that can be analysed using
traditional tools. Indeed, we could go so far as to use a static analysis (e.g. the parameter of
a fitted power-law relationship) as the subject of a time-series and consider how this value
changes over time. The di culty lies, of course, in selecting an appropriate feature, or set of
features, that adequately captures the real-world behaviour of interest.
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Within the literature we found examples of dynamic unlabelled network analysis using a
variety of methods, including scan statistics [149, 135, 31, 116, 144, 120], Bayesian inference
[70], auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) models [148], and link prediction [76]. The use
of these methods has mostly focused on individual nodes, or ego-nets, considering the node
degree or the size of the ego-net.
Link prediction attempts to predict future interactions between individuals based on
previous interactions. In order to detect anomalies, a link prediction algorithm is run, and
for each pair of individuals in the network, the likelihood of interaction occurring in the
next time-step is calculated. This predicted likelihood is then compared to the observed
interactions, and those observed interactions having a low predicted likelihood are deemed
anomalous [76].
Using scan statistics, analysis is performed by averaging a time-series over a moving
window [t   ⌧, t] and comparing this average to the current time-step. If the di↵erence is
larger than some predefined threshold, the time-step is considered to be anomalous [149,
135, 31, 116, 144]. The use of ARMA models involves fitting the model to a time series and
considering the residuals for this fit (see Pincombe [148]). Those residuals above a specified
cut-o↵ are deemed to represent anomalous time-steps.
In Bayesian analysis, the generated time series is assumed to follow some distribution (i.e.
each time-step represents a draw from the assumed distribution). Given an initial estimation
of the distribution parameters, a series of updates can be performed in an iterative manner.
For each time step, the prior distribution is updated by considering the value at that time
step and calculating a posterior distribution that incorporates the information from all of
the previous time steps. Using this posterior distribution, a p-value is calculated, giving
the probability that the value at the next time step was drawn from this distribution. If
this p-value is below a significance threshold, the value can be considered anomalous. The
posterior distribution is then treated as the prior for the next update [70].
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The use of scan statistics is the most prominent form of analysis we found in the liter-
ature, and extensions to the basic form have been suggested that allow correlated changes
in graph properties to be detected [31]. This enables inter-related vertices or subgraphs to
be identified, and may be of benefit in detecting clandestine organisations. Another exten-
sion is the application to hypergraphs [144], which are a generalisation of graphs allowing
hyperedges that can connect more than two vertices. Such graphs can be used to represent
interactions that involve more than two individuals such as meetings, group emails and text
messages, and co-authorship on research papers [144, 170].
Other researchers have considered larger structures such as maximal cliques [30], and
coronets 2 [82], with a view to detecting anomalous evolution of a system at a neighbourhood
scale. If we consider only the pattern of interactions between individuals, a maximal clique
can evolve in only six di↵erent ways; by growing, shrinking, merging, splitting, appearing
or vanishing [30]. Similarly, a coronet can evolve only through the insertion or deletion of a
node, or the insertion or deletion of a number of edges. If normal behaviour is assumed to
result in stable, non-evolving neighbourhoods, then any neighbourhood that undergoes one
of these transformations can be considered to be anomalous. For less stable systems, this idea
could obviously be extended to include consideration of the number of neighbourhoods that
change over a time-step, or the magnitude of this change. In such scenarios, scan-statistics,
Bayesian inference or any other form of time-series analysis may be employed in order to
detect anomalous time-steps.
In addition to the approaches discussed above, there is a large body of work that focuses
on anomaly detection in time-series in general (see Cheboli [29] and Chandola [25] for recent
reviews). We believe that these existing methods could also be used to detect dynamic
2A coronet is a concept of neighbourhood, where the ‘closeness’ to a subject is defined in terms of the
number of interactions that occur between individuals, rather than simple connectedness. See [82] for a
formal definition. Note that the number of interactions between two individuals is often expressed as a
weight, which could be considered a label on the edge. However, since multiple interactions can also be
represented by multiple edges, we do not consider this to be a true label.
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anomalies in social networks, assuming that suitable features can be identified for generating
the required time-series. Moreover, substantial work has been undertaken in the field of
change detection in social networks (e.g. McCulloh and Carley [120], Arney and Arney [9],
and Tambayong [176], and we believe that there is considerable room for cross-over between
these two fields.
A.6.4 Dynamic labelled anomalies
In conducting our survey, we found dynamic labelled anomalies to be the least represented
in the literature. A recent paper describes the application of a signal processing approach to
anomaly detection in dynamic, labelled networks [124], however this was the only example
we found.
Extending the basic signal processing approach used for static, unlabelled anomalies [127,
128], detection of dynamic labelled anomalies assumes that the probability of an edge occur-
ring between any two nodes is a function of the the linear combination of node attributes
[124]. Coe cients for this linear combination are fitted to the network of interest. The
dynamic nature of the network is handled by considering the network structure in discrete
time-steps, and treating each time-step as for a static network. Comparing the expected
graph to the observed graph in each time-step gives a residual matrix that can be integrated
over a specified time period using a filter (see Miller, Arcolano, and Bliss [124] and Miller,
Beard, and Bliss [126] for details). Note that this method assumes the number of vertices
remains constant over the specified time-period, and that only the edges change.
In addition to the signal processing approach described above, we suggest that those
methods used for detecting dynamic unlabelled anomalies could be adapted for the detection
of dynamic labelled anomalies. We argue that this type of development will be extremely
beneficial as including additional information provided by node and edge labels is likely to sig-
nificantly improve anomaly detection, providing additional dimensions for separating normal
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and anomalous behaviour. For example, a recent study demonstrated that link prediction
can be significantly improved by including topic information from users tweets [156]. Obvi-
ously if the algorithm used to predict links is improved, any anomaly detection using this
algorithm will also be improved.
As with dynamic unlabelled anomalies, we also suggest that existing methods for time-
series analysis can be applied to the detection of dynamic labelled anomalies. A number
of methods for detecting anomalies within discrete sequences are discussed in [27], and we
believe that many of these methods could be applied to the detection of dynamic labelled
anomalies in social networks.
A.7 Discussion
In this chapter we have surveyed a small but growing number of solutions to detecting
anomalies in online social networks. While these approaches di↵er in their treatment of
the network, considering dynamic or static representations and including or ignoring node
attributes, they are all based primarily on the analysis of interactions between individuals.
It is this basis that di↵erentiates the detection of anomalies in social networks form other
forms of anomaly detection.
Note that while anomalies and networks can be characterised as static or dynamic, la-
belled or unlabelled etc., the various approaches to anomaly detection can, of course, also
be grouped by the types of algorithms employed and also the problem domain they were
originally developed to address. In conducting our survey, we found it quite interesting that
the partitioning of detection methods by algorithm type very nearly matches the partition
induced by the authorship of related literature. During our review, we found very little
crossover between the di↵erent research groups exploring this area, with each group tending
to focus on a single or limited number of approaches. Certainly, we did not find clear lines
of development, where a particular approach has evolved through incremental improvements
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over a large number of iterations. Clearly, this reflects the young nature of this field, and we
anticipate that this state of a↵airs will change significantly over the next decade.
In considering how the various approaches presented in the literature apply to di↵erent
types of network anomalies, we found that the methods used to actually detect anomalies, as
opposed to calculating network features, is largely independent of the type of anomaly being
detected. Once a suitable feature space has been identified and calculated, it is often the case
that any number of traditional anomaly detection techniques could be applied. For example,
in Section A.6.1 (static unlabelled anomalies), we discuss the use of regression to detect
anomalous ego-nets displaying an unusual edge count relative to node count [5]. However,
rather than applying regression, once the edge count - node count feature space is extracted,
an alternative anomaly detection method, such as a nearest neighbour method, could just
as easily have been applied. Therefore, we argue that the process of detecting anomalies in
social networks is composed of two quite separable sub-processes; namely, the calculation
of a suitable feature space, and the detection of anomalies within this space. Moreover, we
argue that the selection of a suitable feature space can be further broken down so that, taking
a high level view of the problem, the vast majority of the approaches we reviewed can be
generalised into the following five steps.
1. Determine the smallest unit a↵ected by the behaviour of interest (node, neighbourhood,
community, etc).
2. Identify the particular properties of this unit that are expected to deviate from the
norm.
3. Identify the context in which these deviations are expected to occur.
4. Calculate the properties of interest, extracting a feature space in which the distances
between observations can be measured and compared in a meaningful way.
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5. Within this space, calculate distances between observations, possibly applying tradi-
tional (non-network) tools for anomaly detection (e.g. clustering, nearest neighbour
analysis etc.).
In each of the papers surveyed we found something akin to the five steps given above.
Obviously there is a major focus on step 4, as the naive approach to this step is often
computationally expensive. Given the size of many online social networks, and the demand
for tools to handle Big Data we see the development of scalable anomaly detection solutions
as being an extremely important area of research. However, we also see the selection of a
suitable feature space (steps 1 - 3) as being equally important.
We believe that our steps 1 - 3, which encompass the mapping of real-world behaviours
of interest to suitable feature spaces, form a key challenge for detecting anomalies in social
networks. In conducting our survey, few of the papers we reviewed explicitly described how
the mapping between the behaviour of interest and the network properties considered was
performed. Those few papers that did (e.g. Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos [2], Shrivastava,
Majumder, and Rastogi [169], Friedland [52], Gao et al. [55], and Ji, Yang, and Gao [82]),
clearly explained the combination of domain knowledge and mathematical reasoning that
underpin the use of a particular approach and the examination particular network features.
For the majority of papers though, the reasons for considering a particular set of features
were unclear, and in many examples the real-world behaviour giving rise to any anomalies
detected was discussed only in response to the anomaly actually being found, rather than as
a motivation for using a particular approach. We believe that this is problematic as many
of the approaches we reviewed were tested only on a single, or a limited number of data
sets, and may therefore be biased towards the particular anomalies inherent in those data
sets. Without explicit reasoning as to why a particular behaviour should be identifiable
by a particular anomalous network feature there is no reason to suspect that this feature
will behave in a particular manner across di↵erent data sets, representing di↵erent social
networks.
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The lack of papers clearly describing the reasons for examining a particular set of features
suggests to us that selection of a suitable feature space may be extremely di cult in practice.
Many properties of social networks are correlated in some fashion, and it is not clear which
combinations of features can be used to capture orthogonal concepts. Some comparison of
feature spaces has been undertaken (e.g. Hassanzadeh, Nayak, and Stebila [68] and McCulloh
and Carley [120]), however such comparisons have been restricted in the number of features
considered, and the types of anomalies being detected. We predict that the requirements for
anomaly detection in social networks will rapidly advance in the near future, with ever larger
volumes of data and increasingly complex behaviours being considered. This may in turn lead
to the consideration of increasingly complex feature spaces. Thus the development of any
guidelines or heuristics for mapping real-world behaviour to appropriate feature spaces will be
of benefit. One possibility that we see for identifying suitable feature spaces is the application
of a shotgun approach. By applying multiple detection techniques across numerous graph
properties, it may be possible to identify mechanistic links between the actual behaviours of
interest and resulting changes in network properties, and to determine those features that
best di↵erentiate anomalous and normal behaviours.
Another major challenge for detecting anomalies in online social networks is the evaluation
and comparison of di↵erent methods. Clearly, not all algorithms are universally applicable,
and many of the existing approaches have been developed with specific problem domains and
data formats in mind. Moreover, there is a distinct lack of publicly available data sets with
known ground truths. In order to compare existing and novel techniques, it is important
to consider how accuracy (recall) and precision are influenced by the scale of the analysis,
the density of anomalies, and the magnitude of di↵erence between anomalous and normal
observations. However, the range of di↵erent data sets required to perform such comparisons
is not currently available. Thus many approaches are tested on a single data set, with
verification of results performed for the top ranked anomalies using manual investigation.
For example, Pandit et al. [142] analyse transactions in an online auction system, and in
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order to test their approach results were ranked according to an anomaly score. The top-
ranked user accounts were then manually investigated by checking the auction website for
complaints made against these accounts. This type of manual investigation is highly time-
consuming and highly dependent on the level of reporting by the owners of the target system.
In many cases, manual investigation of user accounts in this way is impossible.
Some data sets do exist that are relatively well characterised, including the Enron email
data set and to a lesser extent the Paraiso communication (synthetic, VAST 2008, www.cs.
umd.edu/hcil/VASTchallenge08/). Anomalies detected within these data sets can be easily
verified against the known series of events. However these data sets are relatively small, and
may only be suitable for a small subset of problem domains. Therefore, in order to address
this challenge, we believe that the generation of synthetic data sets is a logical course of
action.
A number of methods for generating random social networks have been proposed, ranging
from simple models assuming some global probability that a given pair of nodes will be
connected to more complex models considering the dynamics of each individual node [122].
Between these two extremes lies a broad spectrum of models that have been developed
over time and thus reflect our growing understanding of the general properties of social
networks (e.g. high transitivity, positive, assortivity, presence of community structures).
Consequently, early models (reviewed by Chakrabarti and Faloutsos [22], see also Sallaberry,
Zaidi, and Melanc¸on [157]) capture only a small number of what we now consider to be
general properties of social networks [4], while more recent models (e.g. [4, 157]) are able
to reproduce far more realistic representations of a wide range of social networks. As an
example, Akoglu and Faloutsos [4] describe eleven properties of social networks which they
suggest should be reproduced by random network generators and provide a suitable method
for generation that does indeed reproduce these properties. This method is reported to be
highly flexible, and can be used to generate weighted or unweighted, directed or undirected
and unipartite or bipartite networks. The method has since been applied in the testing of a
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novel anomaly detection method, being used to generate a bipartite network representing user
reviews of online products in an e-commerce setting [2] (a method for generating these types
of networks is also described as part of the Berlin SPARQL Benchmark http://wifo5-03.
informatik.uni-mannheim.de/bizer/berlinsparqlbenchmark, last accessed May, 2014).
The vast majority of network generation methods proposed to date can be described as
phenomenological in nature. While these methods are able to reproduce many of the known
properties of social networks, they do so without describing the underlying mechanisms that
cause these properties to arise. In contrast, agent-based models (alternatively, individual-
based models) such as that proposed by Menges, Mishra, and Narzisi [122] (see also Glasser
and Lindauer [62] and Hummel et al. [77]) describe the specific actions taken by individuals
in the underlying system that lead to the formation of a social network. In this type of sim-
ulation, the macro-level properties of the resulting social network can be seen as emergent
properties stemming from the micro-level behaviour of the underlying agent-based system.
The model does not explicitly set out to reproduce these properties, but rather to represent
the behaviour of the individuals involved. In the course of representing this behaviour, the
model reproduces a realistic social network. We believe that this approach has great poten-
tial for generating realistic data sets and represents an extremely interesting area of research,
particularly in adversarial problem domains where anomalous agents could attempt to dis-
guise their behaviour by mimicking ’normal’ agents.
In this chapter we have surveyed a number of approaches for detecting anomalies in
online social networks. We found that these di↵erent approaches can be usefully categorised
based on characterisation of anomalies as being static or dynamic and labelled or unlabelled.
Depending on this characterisation, di↵erent features of the network may be examined, and
we have suggested that the selection of appropriate features is a highly non-trivial task. We
believe that as the requirements of social network analysis continue to grow, the challenges
inherent in Big Data analysis will necessitate sophisticated heuristics and algorithms for
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mapping complex behaviours to network features, and scalable solutions for calculating rich
feature spaces which can be subjected to anomaly detection analysis.
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